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If the brain were so simple we could understand it, we would be so 
simple we couldn't.  
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The dynamics of attention in serial visual processing 
 
Gathering, selecting and weighing information from our adjacencies 
are fundamental parts of human perception and a necessary 
precondition to successfully interact with our environment. And even 
though the end-result of these processes, our everyday perception, 
seems unambiguous and effortless to achieve (we just open our eyes 
and there it is), a great deal of our cortical areas and cognitive 
mechanisms are dedicated to produce this perception. One essential 
aspect in this procedure is to prioritize relevant over irrelevant 
information, a process commonly known as selective attention. 
William James wrote: “my experience is what I agree to attend to” 
(1890, p. 402). It becomes immediately clear from that quote that 
attention is, at least to some degree, under voluntary control. This 
means that we can choose whether we attend to a certain stimulus or 
not. However, this is not the whole story. If we perceive a sudden 
and unexpected movement in our peripheral visual field, this will 
most likely interrupt our current task and will automatically turn our 
head to see what is happening there. This means that the attentional 
orienting process cannot only be elicited voluntarily in a goal-driven 
manner, but also automatically by salient stimuli in our environment. 
To what extent attention is elicited by bottom up stimulus saliency 
and by the voluntarily top down task set, respectively, is still a matter 
of debate (e.g. prominent: Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; 
Theeuwes, 1992, 1994, also see Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 
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2010; and Ansorge, Horstmann, & Scharlau, 2010, for more recent 
studies). There is empirical evidence that suggests that the bottom-
up influence is initially strong, but vanishes over time (e.g. Donk & 
van Zoest, 2008). 
This orienting implies that attention has a limited spatial extent, much 
like the fovea on the retina. In order to attend to another location, 
attention must first disengage from the current location, then move, 
and finally engage at the new location. The idea of such a “spotlight 
of attention” dates at least back to Helmholtz (1867, p. 741, also see 
James, 1890, p. 438) and is, as we will see below, still very popular 
among psychologist (see e.g. Posner & Petersen, 1990).1  
According to Ward (2008), orienting is one of the three main aspects 
of attention, the other two being searching and filtering. Unlike in 
orienting, in which we (automatically or voluntarily) react to the 
appearance of a new stimulus, in search we are actively looking for a 
certain stimulus. This search can be done very quickly and easily if 
the stimulus we search for differs from the surrounding stimuli in a 
single dimension like color, size, orientation or shape (for instance a 
blue paperback among green paperbacks on a bookshelf). In fact, 
this search can be completed in roughly the same time regardless of 
the number of surrounding non-targets. If, however, the stimulus we 
are looking for differs from the surrounding distractor-stimuli by a 
conjunction of features (for instance a particular combination of color 
and shape, like a green apple among red apples and green pears), 
the number of surrounding non-targets has a large effect on search 
Figure I: 
spotlight of attention 
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times (e.g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). It is hypothesized that the 
simple, single feature search (the blue among green books; also 
known as pop-out or parallel search) can be done without focusing 
attention on each of the stimuli in turn (e.g. Woodman & Luck, 1999). 
The feature-conjunction search (the green apple among red apples 
and green pears; also known as serial search) on the other hand, 
requires that the simple features (in this example shape and color) 
are bound together into an integrated perceptual object (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980; but see Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989). In this model, 
attention is the glue that pastes the different features together. This 
feature integration must be performed for each stimulus in turn until 
the target (the green apple) is found, explaining the higher search 
times for more crowded scenes.  
As with most psychological theories, this interpretation of search 
times is not undisputed. Although it is widely accepted that 
attentional processing of targets defined by conjunctions of features 
is more demanding than processing of targets that are defined by a 
single feature (e.g. Bundesen, 1990; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989), it 
is still unclear whether this is due to integration or not. The observed 
differences may also appear due to the difference between bottom-
up saliency and goal-driven attentional deployment in orienting as 
discussed above (see e.g. Posner, 1980): If the target differs in only 
one feature-dimension from the surrounding distractors (e.g. color), 
this target automatically elicits an attentional orienting process, 
because it is the most salient stimulus in the scene. If on the other 
Figure II: 
Schematic 
representations and 
idealized search 
functions for single-
feature and feature-
conjuntion search 
 9 
 
hand the target is defined as a combination of certain features, it is 
not a priori the most bottom-up salient object. This means that 
attention has to be voluntarily oriented to each object in turn until the 
target is found. As Trick and Enns (1998, p. 371) point out, it is most 
likely that feature binding and spatial orienting are both required in 
any visual search task and should therefore be seen as 
complementary and not as competing.  
The third aspect of attention described by Ward (2008) is filtering. 
Filtering means that we can quickly extract a great deal of 
information from attended stimuli and at the same time suppress 
information from unattended stimuli. The most impressive examples 
of filtering are inattentional blindness and the cocktail-party effect. 
Inattentional blindness can be characterized as the failure to detect 
an unexpected, yet fully visible object, as attention is occupied with a 
different task (for an overview, see e.g. Simons, 2007). In a highly 
prominent study by Simons and Chabris (1999), participants had to 
watch a short video-clip and count basketball passes by players 
wearing white shirts while ignoring passes made by players wearing 
black shirts. With this additional task, about half of the observers 
failed to notice “when a person in a gorilla suit entered the display, 
stopped and faced the camera, thumped its chest, and exited on the 
far side of the display” (Simons, 2007). Although the term “blindness” 
suggests that the missed stimulus (i.e. the gorilla) is not processed at 
all, the related cocktail-party effect indicates otherwise. Early studies 
by Cherry (1953), Treisman (1964), and Moray (1959) using a 
Figure III: 
Invisible gorilla test 
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dichotic-listening task showed that strong cues from the unattended 
audio-stream (like one’s own name) are consciously perceived, and 
that information from the unattended stream can be recalled when 
task-demands on the attended stream are lowered, suggesting that 
the information in the non-attended stream is at least processed up 
to the semantic level. 
Later on, the dichotic-listening task was converted to the visual 
domain by Neisser and coworkers, using two distinct, but 
superimposed videos instead of auditory streams (e.g. Neisser & 
Becklen, 1975). Their results resemble the ones observed in the 
auditory domain quite closely (also see Wolford & Morrison, 1980).  
The dichotic-listening and inattentional-blindness experiments fueled 
the debate about when exactly attentional filtering takes place and to 
what degree unattended information are processed. This dispute 
between early- (e.g. Broadbent, 1958) and late- (e.g. Duncan, 1980) 
selection theories dominated the literature for quite a while. As 
Pashler (2004, p.5) concludes, more recent evidence suggests that 
perceptual selectivity is possible although it is often less than 100% 
successful (e.g. Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Yantis & Johnston, 
1990). This “compromise” fits well with Treisman’s approach (1960), 
suggesting that filtering attenuates rather than abolishes processing 
of non-attended stimuli. This means that the filter in Treisman’s 
model therefore allows unattended stimuli to pass trough, but only in 
an attenuated form. This mechanism ensures that highly relevant but 
unattended information can reach consciousness as well.  
Figure V: 
Frames from the 
two films used by 
Neisser & Becklen, 
1976 
Figure IV: 
schematic 
representation of a 
dichotic-listening task 
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So what is attention? As yet, no exact definition has been agreed 
upon, but an elegant summary of what attention characterizes was 
given by James more than hundred years ago (1890, p. 403-404): "It 
is the taking possession in the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one 
out of several simultaneous possible objects or trains of thought. 
Focalization, concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It 
implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with 
others". This quote illustrates that James especially emphasized the 
filtering aspect of attention. We will return to the question of 
attentional filtering later, when we discuss several theories of the 
attentional-blink phenomenon.  
In the last several decades the empirical focus of attention research 
has shifted to the visual domain (see, e.g. Pashler, 2004, p.4). Since 
then, researchers have addressed many fundamental questions 
about the way in which visual information is selected. A number of 
studies support Helmholtz’s claim of a spotlight of attention, most 
prominently the cueing experiments done by Posner and colleagues 
in the late 70s and early 80s (e.g. Posner, 1978, 1980, Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980; also see Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 
2005). In these experiments, participants were asked to detect a light 
appearing in one of several possible conditions around fixation. In the 
majority of the trials one of the locations was precued, indicating at 
what location the light most likely appeared. Posner’s results were 
unambiguous: response times were fastest when the light actually 
appeared at the precued location and slowest when the light was 
Figure VI: 
Spatial cueing 
paradigm in the 
style of Prinzmetal 
and colleagues 
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presented at a different location than the precue indicated. Reaction 
times of uncued trials lied almost exactly in between the valid- and 
invalid-cued trials. Further evidence that attention can be directed to 
a specific spatial location comes from LaBerge and coworkers 
(LaBerge, 1983; LaBerge & Brown, 1986). LaBerge was interested in 
the spatial extend of the spotlight. Therefore, he asked subjects to 
perform two successive tasks on each trial. The second task was 
always to detect a dot appearing at one of 5 possible positions. The 
first task was either to determine whether a string of five letters 
formed a word (the word task), or whether the middle letter in that 
five-letter string was a vowel (the letter task). LaBerge hypothesized 
and found that the word task required participants to attend to the 
five-letter string as a whole, resulting in a wide attentional spotlight. 
Therefore the reaction times in detecting the dot (the secondary task) 
did not differ as a function of dot position. In the letter task on the 
contrary, subjects focused their attention at the middle letter of the 
string, since this was the only task relevant. As a result, reaction 
times for the secondary task got slower and slower the larger the 
distance between the dot and the middle position became. These 
results furthermore indicate that the size of the focus of attention 
depends of the task at hand (cf. the zoom-lens model described in 
Footnote 1), and that the attentional spotlight does not have a distinct 
range, but is rather distributed in a gradient fashion. 
This latter claim is further supported by the illusory line motion 
phenomenon (e.g. Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993a, b, c). In 
Figure VII: 
Prototypical shape 
of the attended 
region found by 
LaBerge 
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this phenomenon participants have to fixate on a dot at the middle of 
the screen. Next, a stationary line is presented at one of the dot’s 
ends. In the vast majority of participants this induces the impression 
of motion: it seems as if the line grows from the attended dot towards 
the unattended end. This perception can be explained as the result of 
an attentional gradient: the dot is the attended object, the parts of the 
line closest to the dot fall into the spotlight as well. With increasing 
distance to the dot, the gradient and thus the attentional facilitation 
get weaker, resulting in the impression of asynchrony in appearance 
of the line (see Scharlau & Horstmann, 2006, p. 88; also see 
Shimojo, Hikosaka, & Miyauchi, 1999; Bachmann, 1999).   
One last aspect of the spotlight metaphor should be discussed here. 
If attention shifts from one location (for instance the fixation point) to 
another (e.g. the target-location), how does it move? Does it 
illuminate intervening locations? Does it move at a fixed speed so 
that locations farer away take longer to be reached? Whereas the 
answer to the first question remains uncertain, the second one can 
be negated (see Yantis, 2004, p. 236). Data from Remington and 
Pierce (1984), as well as Kwak, Dagenbach, and Egeth (1991) and 
Kröse and Julesz (1989) all indicate that spatial distance over which 
attention has to travel does not influence the time until it gets there. 
However, as Yantis (2004, p. 236) points out, these results do not 
falsify the spotlight metaphor, as it is still possible that attention 
moves at a variable velocity, for instance it could move faster the 
further it has to go.  
Figure VIII: 
Illusory Line Motion 
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After looking at several spatial characteristics of attention, I will now 
come back to the question what triggers an attentional shift. As 
quoted at the beginning of this manuscript, James emphasized that 
we can voluntarily direct our attention to specific stimuli (in his words: 
active). He also noted that certain stimuli, “very intense, voluminous, 
or sudden” (James, 1890, p. 416) immediately and involuntary draw 
attention to themselves (i.e. passive).  It wasn’t until a century later 
before Jonides (1981) empirically tested whether one could resist this 
automatic attentional capture. To this end, he employed two different 
kinds of cues: peripheral, i.e. at the target-location, and central, i.e. a 
cue at fixation that pointed at the target-location. Jonides found that 
while it was easy to disregard the central cues, it was nearly 
impossible to ignore the peripheral cue, even when it never appeared 
at the correct target location (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992). 
However, the attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli might not be as 
absolute as originally thought. For instance Bacon and Egeth (1994) 
demonstrated that a task-irrelevant singleton only captured attention 
when the target was defined as a singleton as well (albeit in a 
different dimension). When the target was defined in a more complex 
way, the irrelevant singleton had no negative effect on task 
performance. This led to the idea of an attentional control setting, 
stating that only stimuli which are compatible with an a priori 
determined feature set will tend to receive attention (e.g. Folk, 
Remington, & Wright, 1994; Folk, Remington, Johnston, 1992). In 
view of this theory, the incapability to ignore the non-predictive cue in 
Figure IX: 
peripheral and 
central cueing 
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Jonides (1981) is a result of the fact that both the cue and the target 
had a sudden onset, therefore the feature-dimension “onset” was 
relevant, even though the cue itself was not. This hypothesis is not 
undisputed. Whether and to what extend singletons that do not fit the 
attentional set still capture attention is still the matter of a heated 
debate (e.g. Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008; Folk, Remington, 
and Wu, 2009; Schreij, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2010a, b).  
Another difference between “active” and “passive” attentional 
deployment is much less equivocal: Müller and Rabbitt (1989) found 
that central and peripheral cues had distinctively different time 
courses. Whereas “passive”, automatically elicited attention is 
transient, i.e. is deployed rapidly and diminishes shortly afterwards, 
“active”, voluntary attention, is sustained, i.e. it takes longer until it is 
deployed, but it diminishes rather slowly. These results were later 
corroborated in several different paradigms (e.g. Nakayama & 
Mackeben, 1989; Cheal & Lyon, 1991; Carlson, Hogendoorn, & 
Verstraten, 2006). These rapid and transient characteristics of 
attention are not only relevant when attention is deployed in space, 
but also when it is deployed in time, to which I will turn next.2  
Much of the earlier work concentrated on understanding how humans 
process information distributed across space. In the remaining part of 
this manuscript, I will concentrate on the temporal aspects of 
attention. Interest in this line of research has only risen in roughly the 
last twenty five years. Since then researchers have addressed many 
fundamental questions about the way in which visual information is 
Figure X:  
schematic functions 
of transient and 
sustained attentional 
deployment 
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selected: How are items selected, when they compete for attention in 
time rather than in space? Has attention to “dwell” on one object, 
before it can turn to another? Does the processing of an earlier 
stimulus impair the chances of a later object to reach 
consciousness? Does it enhance them (e.g. Duncan, Ward, & 
Shapiro, 1994; Bonnel & Prinzmetal, 1998; Broadbent & Broadbent, 
1987; Bachmann, 1984)? 
In the past two decades the “rapid serial visual presentation” design 
has become a fruitful experimental paradigm for questions regarding 
the temporal nature of attention (RSVP; Lawrence, 1971; Potter & 
Levy, 1969). In RSVP visual stimuli, e.g. digits and letters, appear 
sequentially at the same spatial location, each presented for a tenth 
of a second or less and immediately replaced by the next one. 
Observers are usually instructed to either report all items they have 
seen (whole report), or to report pre-defined target items (for 
example digits) and ignore the remaining distractor stimuli (for 
instance letters; partial report; e.g. Nieuwenstein & Potter, 2006). By 
manipulating the presentation speed, changing the amount of 
information the observer has to report, and coupling the behavioral 
measure with EEG recordings, the RSVP paradigm has provided 
researchers with a versatile tool to study not only the time course of 
attention and memory consolidation, but also how brain processes 
contribute to conscious information processing (see Chun & Wolfe, 
2001; Dux & Marois, 2009, p. 2). 
Figure XI: 
Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation 
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Especially the two-target version of the RSVP paradigm has become 
increasingly popular to investigate an apparent limitation in visual 
perception: Whereas observers have little to no difficulties in 
reporting the first target stimulus (T1) in a sequence of distractors, 
they often fail to identify the second target (T2) when it is presented 
up to 500 ms after the first (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987). It is as if 
attention, analogous to the lid closure of an eye blink, briefly switches 
off before new information can be processed. Hence, this 
phenomenon was named the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, 
Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992 p. 858). This second-target deficit is quite 
robust: over the years, it was found in hundreds of studies, it is 
reliable for a vast majority of subjects even after extensive training 
(e.g. Taatgen, Juvina, Schipper, Borst, Martens, 2009) and it can be 
found with a number of different types of stimuli like words (e.g. 
Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Luck, Vogel, Shapiro, 1996), 
alphanumerical stimuli (e.g. Hilkenmeier & Scharlau, 2010), symbols 
(e.g. Chun & Potter, 1995), or pictures (e.g. Evans & Treisman, 
2005). Moreover, the attentional blink can also be found within 
different modalities, e.g. auditory (Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997) 
or tactile (Hillstrom, Shapiro, Spence, 2002). All of this suggests that 
the attentional blink reflects a fundamental mechanism of human 
attention; and thus can give us insight into the basic components of 
information selection and processing (see Martens & Wyble, 2010).  
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The basic empirical finding that the second of two task-relevant 
stimuli in a stream of irrelevant distractors is often missed gave rise 
to theories stating that when the first target-stimulus (T1) in the 
stream is detected, a process is triggered to ensure T1’s encoding 
and consolidation till it reaches consciousness. This processing not 
only takes time, but momentarily consumes most of the attentional 
resources available. As a result, when T2 is presented shortly 
afterwards, there are little attentional resources left. Therefore, T2 
cannot be processed properly and eventually its representation is 
lost, i.e. the blink occurs (e.g. Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1996; 
Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994). When the temporal distance 
between T1 and T2 increases, it is more likely that T1 has already 
finished processing. Thus, on average there are more and more 
attentional resources freed up; and successful encoding and 
consolidation of T2 becomes more and more likely.  
Interestingly, when T1 and T2 are presented right after each other 
within 100 ms, T2 performance is virtually unimpaired, a finding 
known as lag-1 sparing (Potter, Chun, Muckenhoupt, 1998, Visser, 
Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999).3 The lag-1 sparing result is especially 
surprising for the afore mentioned theories of resource-depletion: 
When T2 is presented in such close proximity to T1, all resources 
should be devoted to T1. Hence, T2 performance at lag 1 should be 
worst, not unimpaired.  
 
Figure XII: 
resource-depletion 
model: blink 
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Figure 1: Typical time course of the attentional blink. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. The data is taken from the 
100 ms / item condition of the “RSVP-Speed” experiment described 
later in this manuscript. 
 
To account for this intriguing result, many theories modified the basic 
resource-limitation account by introducing two different stages of 
processing and a sluggish attentional gate (most prominent: Chun & 
Potter, 1995). In the first, capacity-free stage, multiple stimuli are 
analyzed in parallel. If one of the stimuli shows task-relevant 
features, this stimulus opens an attentional gate (also known as 
“episode”, Chun & Potter, 1995; “batch”, Jolicœur, Tombu, Oriet, 
Stevanovski, 2002; “window”, Visser et al, 1999; or “event”, Akyürek, 
Riddell, Toffanin, & Hommel, 2007) and is transferred to the second 
stage of processing. In this second stage, the stimulus is further 
encoded and consolidated until it obtains a more durable 
representation and becomes consciously reportable. In contrast to 
stage 1, processing in the second stage is resource-heavy. This 
means that stage 2 can only work in a serial manner, i.e. it can only 
Figure XIII: 
2-stage-model: 
lag-1 sparing 
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process one “chunk” of information per time. However, the attentional 
gate to the second stage does not close right after T1, but rather  
“sluggishly” (e.g. Potter, 2006; Potter, Staub, and O’Connor, 2002). 
The post-T1 item can slip through the gate as well and will most likely 
be processed together with T1 in stage 2. If the post-T1 item is a 
distractor, it will accidentally receive privileged processing. The 
system will eventually realize that this stimulus is not task-relevant 
and will discard it. In case of lag 1, the post-T1-item is T2, which 
explains the high performance for both targets within 100 ms. This 
joint processing of the two targets in stage 2 is commonly known as 
episodic integration. With the auxiliary assumption of episodic 
integration, resource-limitation theories can easily predict the time 
course of T2 performance in RSVP as depicted in Figure 1: when 
both targets are presented within 100 ms, they are processed in one 
episode, hence T2 accuracy is unimpaired. When T2 is presented 
about 200 ms after T1, the attentional gate to the second stage is 
already shut down and therefore T2 has to wait until processing of T1 
in stage 2 is finished: “When T2 appears before the second stage is 
free, it will be detected by Stage 1 processing, but Stage 2 
processing will be delayed. The longer the delay, the greater the 
probability that T2 will have been lost…” (Chun & Potter, 1995, 
p.122). This explains the steep decrease in T2 performance at lag 2. 
With increasing temporal distance between T1 and T2, it becomes 
more and more likely that T1 consolidation is complete and T2 can 
enter the second stage of processing, explaining the gently inclining Figure XIV: 
2-stage-model:blink 
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performance for T2 between 300 ms and 500 ms.  After about 500 
ms, encoding of T1 should be completed and no longer interfere with 
processing of T2 and T2 performance should again be unimpaired. 
Theories that incorporate episodic integration and two stages of 
processing are still widely popular in the attentional blink literature 
(e.g. Bownman & Wyble, 2007; Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998; Dux & 
Harris, 2007a; see Dux & Marois, 2009 for a recent review). Besides 
the basic time course of the AB, episodic-integration theories can 
account for a number of related findings as well: The claim that the 
T2-deficit arises because T2 has to wait for T1 processing to be 
completed and is therefore prone to decay and overwriting by 
subsequent stimuli is well supported by data from Giesbrecht and Di 
Lollo (1998). Their data show that the blink is strongly attenuated 
when T2 is the last item in the stream and can therefore not be 
overwritten by trailing distractors (also see Vogel & Luck, 2002; and 
Sessa, Luria, Verleger, & Dell’Acqua, 2006).  
In two of my own experiments, I could largely replicate this latter 
result. When the distractor trailing T2 (the T2+1 item) was replaced 
with a blank, the blink was nearly absent. However, when a later 
distractor was replaced instead (the T2+2, or T2+3 item), the time 
course of the attentional blink did not differ significantly. Interestingly, 
replacing the T2+1 item had the same effect as T2 being the last item 
in the stream (see Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998). This means that the 
additional 100 ms were sufficient to shield T2 from getting overwritten 
by trailing distractors.  
Figure XV: 
summary of 
experiment 
„T2+1 blank“ 
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Figure 2: results of the “T2+1 blank” experiment as a function of lag 
and condition. Left: conditional T2 accuracy. Right (top): T1 
accuracy, right (bottom): proportion of order reversals. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Episodic integration theories can also explain the controversial 
finding that the blink gets stronger the more similar T1 and the T1+1 
distractor are (Isaak, Shapiro, & Martin, 1999; Chun & Potter, 1995; 
but see e.g. Maki, Bussard, Lopez & Digby, 2003). According to 
episodic integration, T1 and the adjacent distractor are processed 
together in the second stage. When both items are quite similar, 
disentangling the target from the distractor takes longer. Therefore 
processing of T2 is even more delayed and the probability of T2 
getting overwritten increases. Likewise, the attentional blink is 
strongly attenuated when the T1+1 distractor is replaced by a blank 
(Chun & Potter, 1995, Raymond et al., 1992). 
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One empirical finding in particular made Potter and colleagues 
rethink their original two-stage model (Potter, Staub and O’Connor, 
2002): As can be seen in Figure 1, T1 performance at lag 1 is 
impaired compared to later lags. It seems as if the high T2 accuracy 
at lag 1 comes at the cost of decreased T1 performance. In fact, T2 
often outperforms T1 if the two targets are presented in close 
succession. This reliable finding challenges the basic two-stage 
account. How can T2 performance be superior to T1 performance 
when T1 enters the second stage first and therefore gets privileged 
access to limited capacity processing resources in any case? Potter 
and colleagues enhanced the original two-stage model to a “two-
stage competition model”, which postulates that T1 does not 
automatically get access to the resources in stage 2, but that the 
targets compete in stage 1. Depending on the respective 
circumstances, the more salient target wins and will be processed. 
This results in a tradeoff between the targets: the attentional 
resources that one target wins (and which lead to that it is identified), 
the other target automatically loses (Potter, 2006). Whichever target 
wins this competition at stage 1 is transferred to the second stage 
first. This does not mean that the two-stage completion model cannot 
predict lag-1 sparing: When the temporal distance is short, and yet 
both targets get identified at stage 1, they can both enter stage 2 
together and are still processed as one episode. In case T2 wins the 
competition at stage 1, it actually is T1 which is spared, not T2.  
Figure XVI: 
2-stage-competition 
model: T1/T2 tradeoff 
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To summarize: at very short temporal intervals, the mechanisms of 
the two-stage competition model differ from the mechanisms in the 
basic two-stage model. In the former, at intervals below 100 ms T2 
steals all the identification resources elicited by T1. Therefore T2 will 
be identified easily and can enter stage 2. T1, however, has little 
resources left and will not become identified at stage 1. Thus it 
cannot join T2 in stage-2 processing and its representation is lost. At 
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) around 100 ms, T2 enters the 
competition a little bit later, which gives T1 time to utilize some 
resources for its own. T2 often gets the remaining ones, both targets 
will be identified at stage 1 and therefore can both enter stage 2. 
When the temporal interval between T1 and T2 increases to about 
200 ms, T2 comes too late to compete with T1: T1 already used its 
resources to become identified at stage 1 and is already in stage-2 
processing. As in the original two-stage model, T2 will also be 
identified at stage 1, but as processing at stage 2 is serial, T2 has to 
wait at stage 1 and becomes prone to decay and overwriting (see 
Potter et al., 2002, Potter, 2006, Dux & Marois, 2009). Interestingly, 
the results of Potter et al. (2002) further suggest that competition is 
not bound to a specific location, but overlaps to neighboring ones. 
Moreover, by including direct competition between the two targets, 
Potter and coworkers also incorporated the approach of Shapiro et 
al.’s interference model (1994). Whereas Shapiro and colleagues 
assume competition at a relatively late stage of processing in the 
visual short term memory, Potter et al. (2002) state that the 
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competition appears before the items even enter the second stage of 
processing.  
Over the last years, several studies with three or more targets in a 
single RSVP stream have seriously challenged the capacity-limitation 
interpretation of the blink being a result of resource-heavy T1 
processing: They showed that observers were able to identify several 
proximal targets as long as they were presented immediately after 
each other, a finding referred to as “spreading of the sparing” (e.g. Di 
Lollo et al., 2005; Nieuwenstein & Potter, 2006; Olivers, Van Der 
Stigchel & Hulleman 2007; Kawahara, Kumada  &  Di  Lollo 2006). In 
fact, Kawahara, Enns, and Di Lollo (2006) demonstrated that 
performance for the third target in a stream of three consecutive 
targets was significantly higher than performance of the first target, 
which is clearly at odds with resource-depletion models. Of particular 
interest in this context is the study of Nieuwenstein and Potter 
(2006). In this study participants were able to report a string of up to 
six consecutive colored items without showing an attentional blink. 
When the task changed and participants were asked to report only 
two items of a particular color, the same stimulus string produced the 
standard blink pattern. This means that report- accuracy of the same 
items at the same temporal distance is higher when all stimuli have 
to be reported, in comparison to only two items having to be 
reported. Put differently, observers are able to encode three targets 
in a row in the same time as they otherwise fail to report the second 
of two targets.  
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Another finding that does not sit easily with the limited-capacity idea 
is the fact that T2 performance can be increased when the second 
target is precued. Precueing T2 can be accomplished in several 
ways. In some of our own work we used a temporal cue that provided 
information about the temporal position of T2 (Hilkenmeier, 
Tünnermann, & Scharlau, 2009; Hilkenmeier & Scharlau, 2010; “we” 
is used when I am referring to work that was done with at least one 
coauthor). In these studies the participants’ task was to report two 
digits among distractor letters. In the cueing condition the identity of 
the T1-digit was a valid cue for the lag T2 would appear in. If T1 was 
a “1”, T2 would appear in lag 1, i.e. immediately after T1. If T1 was a 
“3”, T2 would appear in lag 3, i.e. T1 and T2 were delineated by two 
intermediate distractors.  This temporal cue embedded in the identity 
of T1 significantly increased T2 accuracy, even for extremely short 
temporal distances between T1 and T2 of about 50 – 100 ms. This 
means that within this quite short time span the identity of a target is 
processed and the relevant information can rapidly be extracted and 
used to adjust the task and substantially increase performance. This 
finding goes against the notion that an extensive, time-consuming 
identification process causes the blink.  
Another way to increase the identification accuracy of the second 
target is to insert an additional item with a task-relevant feature in the 
RSVP stream just prior to T2. This was for instance done by 
Nieuwenstein and colleagues (Nieuwenstein, 2006; Nieuwenstein, 
Chun, Hooge & Van der Lubbe, 2005). In their studies the task was 
Figure XVII: 
temporal cue used by 
Hilkenmeier and 
colleagues 
Figure XVIII:  
cue used by 
Nieuwenstein and 
colleagues 
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to report two colored digits among black distractor-letters. Cueing T2 
was achieved by coloring the distractor-letter preceding T2. 
Importantly, even distractors that were presented in a different color 
than the to-be-cued targets were highly effective cues, as long as 
their color matched one of the possible target colors. This indicates 
that cueing can occur in the absence of shared features between 
cues and targets, as long as they both match the same attentional 
set (also see Scharlau & Neumann, 2003; Folk, Remington, & 
Johnson, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). The “rapid 
reversal” of the attentional blink found by Olivers et al. (2007; also 
see Kawahara, Kumada et al., 2006; Olivers & Meeter, 2008) goes in 
the same direction: Participants were confronted with a stream 
containing T2 at lag 2 and additionally a third target (T3) at lag 3 
(basically, instead of a cue preceding T2, they used T2 to cue the 
immediately following T3). An attentional blink was found for T2 but 
not for T3 which was almost completely spared; even though it was 
presented in a temporal position relative to the first target which is 
normally strongly impaired (see Figure 1). These results evidence 
that the attentional blink is not, as Raymond et al. (1992, p. 858) 
suggested, ballistic: It can be postponed as long as task-relevant 
information is presented; it can be attenuated when the temporal 
position of T2 is cued; and it can rapidly recover when consecutive 
targets are shown during the blink-period. 
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All of this suggests that attention uses a more flexible mechanism for 
mediating attentional deployment than simply deplete all of its 
resources at once (Wyble et al., 2009).  
To account for these more recent empirical findings, the theoretical 
landscape shifted. Instead of emphasizing on resource-depletion or a 
bottleneck as the source of the attentional blink, Di Lollo and 
colleagues (2005) suggested to focus on the afore mentioned filtering 
aspects of attention. In their “temporary loss of control” model (TLC) 
they do not see the blink as a result of resource-depletion, but as the 
temporary loss of an endogenously established task set. In the 
typical attentional blink paradigm, this task set would be something 
like “reject distractors and accept targets” (see, e.g. Kawahara et al., 
2006, p. 406). Importantly, this filter is volatile rather than static. 
Following an earlier idea of William James (1890, p. 420), the 
endogenous filter needs a periodic maintenance signal to be 
sustained (see Di Lollo et al, 2005, p. 192). In the period leading to 
the first target, this signal can easily be maintained, meaning that the 
pre-T1 distractors can easily be inhibited. When T1 appears, the 
endogenous maintenance signal is discontinued, since the system is 
now busy with consolidating this first target (Olivers & Meeter, 2008, 
p.4; Di Lollo et al, 2005, p. 198). Thus, the filter is no longer under 
endogenous control, but becomes vulnerable to alteration by the 
T1+1 stimulus. If this next item also belongs to the target-category, 
the input filter remains unaltered and the T1+1 stimulus is processed 
efficiently, i.e. sparing occurs. On the other hand, if the T1+1 stimulus 
Figure XIX: 
TLC model: blink 
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is a distractor, it will exogenously disrupt the input filter, prolonging 
any processing of trailing target stimuli, which eventually leads to the 
blink. As soon as consolidation of T1 finishes, the system gradually 
regains control over the input filter again, reinstates the correct task 
set and allows target processing to return to normal.  
As Olivers and Meeter (2008, p. 4) point out, it is questionable 
“whether TLC indeed manages to avoid the limited-capacity resource 
depletion argument.  Notably,  it  assumes  that T1 occupies a central 
executive for some time, during  the  course  of  which  the  system  
is  not ready  for  T2.  It  appears  then  that  limited  capacity  
resources  have  entered  through  the back door”. To be clear, unlike 
limited-capacity models, TLC states that the system can handle more 
than one or two items before its resources deplete. The capacity of 
the visual short term memory is the only limit here. In TLC the 
cognitive system is limited in the way that it can only execute one 
process at any given time, i.e. either maintaining the input filter or 
consolidating T1 (see e.g. Di Lollo et al, 2005, p. 193).  
Taken together, the TLC deserves credit for being one of the first 
attentional-blink theories that “break the bottleneck” and shift the 
focus to attentional filter settings as source of the attentional blink. In 
subsequent years, more and more models followed this theoretical 
shift and emphasized the role of attentional control and attentional 
gating, for instance the “simultaneous type, serial token” model of 
Bowman and Wyble (STST, 2007), the “boost and bounce” theory of 
Olivers and Meeter (B&B, 2008), or the “episodic simultaneous type, 
Figure XX: 
TLC model: 
spreading of the 
sparing 
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serial token” model (eSTST, Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 
2009). All of these theories share the idea that a spatiotemporally  
constrained window  of  attentional  enhancement  is  deployed in  
response  to  detection  of  a  potentially  relevant stimulus (Wyble et 
al., 2009, p. 3). The attentional facilitation is hypothesized in a rapid 
and transient way: the enhancement should peak around 100 ms (or, 
more roughly between 50 ms and 150 ms) and quickly decrease 
afterwards (see Reeves & Sperling, 1986; Nakayama & Mackeben, 
1989; also see the attentional cascade model, Shih, 2008, 2009). In 
all of these theories the attentional facilitation (the “blaster” in 
(e)STST, or the “boost” in boost & bounce) hits the T1+1 item as 
well, allowing for lag 1 sparing. However, the theories differ in the 
way they manage the transition from sparing to the attentional blink: 
The models of Wyble and colleagues (STST; eSTST) as well as the 
attentional cascade model (Shih, 2008) hold on to the idea of time-
consuming consolidation of T1 (and the T1+1 item) suppressing 
further attention until T1 has been encoded. This means that 
eventually T1 causes the blink. In the Boost and Bounce theory on 
the other hand, time-consuming target processing plays no role in the 
rise of the blink. Instead, this model assumes that it is the first 
distractor after target information that shuts down further attentional 
deployment (Olivers & Meeter, 2008).  
Whether the blink is caused by T1 itself, or by the first post-target 
distractor is still a matter of debate. The T2-cueing results of 
Nieuwenstein and coworkers (Nieuwenstein, 2006; Nieuwenstein et 
Figure XXI: 
eSTST: spreading 
of the sparing 
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al., 2005) and the rapid recovery results of Olivers et al., 2007 
indicate that the blink deficit is caused by the first post-target 
distractor, not by T1 itself: In these studies T2 performance increased 
in lags at which T2 is usually blinked, but this increment did not come 
at the cost of reduced T1 performance. If time consuming and 
resource-heavy T1 consolidation causes the blink, one should expect 
some effect on T1 performance since T2 identification interferes with 
T1 consolidation. On the other hand, studies that show decreased T1 
performance when T2 is presented in lag 2, as for instance Potter et 
al. (2002; also see Figure 1) indicate that an early T2 indeed 
interferes with T1 processing. Furthermore there is evidence about 
the post-T1 distractor not being needed to induce the blink, as long 
as T2 is sufficiently masked (Nieuwenstein et al., 2009). This is 
clearly is at odds with the Boost and Bounce theory that emphasizes 
the role of the post-target distractor. 
The theoretical shift from limited capacity and resource depletion to 
attentional control is highly controversial. A number of recent studies 
report that the apparent spreading of the sparing with three targets in 
a row really is due to a tradeoff between T1 and T3 (Dux, Asplund, & 
Marois, 2008; 2009; but see Olivers, Spalek, Kawahara & Di Lollo, 
2009), or that the apparent sparing of T3 really is caused by a 
methodological artifact (Dell’Acqua, Joliceur, Luria, & Pluchino, 
2009). Dell’Acqua et al. report that when T3 accuracy is analyzed 
contingent on correct report of T1 and T2, T3 performance actually is 
impaired. They conclude that the blink is still best explained by a 
Figure XXII: 
eSTST: blink 
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capacity-limited process in which T1 opens an attentional episode. 
T2 can slip into this episode as well when it is presented within 120 
ms of T1 and both targets are processed together. Even if T3 is the 
next item in the row, there are little chances for it to enter the episode 
as well and it will eventually get blinked (2009; p. 28f).  
After conducting a thorough review of the attentional blink literature, 
Dux and Marois (2009, p. 51) argue in a similar vein: they conclude 
that it is possible for a common capacity-limited attentional resource 
to underlie the deficit. According to this view “the process that is  
responsible  for  the  trade-off  between  T1  and  T3  performance  in  
the  serial  target experiments of Dux et al. (2008; 2009) is the same 
which underlies the AB impairment in the  distractor-less  design  of  
Nieuwenstein  et  al.  (2009),  or  the  attenuating  effect  of 
distraction  in  the  experiments  of  Olivers  and  Nieuwenhuis  
(2005;  2006);  namely,  the deployment  of  selective  attention.  The  
more  attention  that  is  deployed  for  T1,  either because  it  is  
more  salient,  more  task  relevant  or  requires  more  encoding  into  
working memory, then the less that is available to process 
subsequent targets. Similarly drawing attention  away  from  T1,  
either  by  cuing  a  distractor  prior  to  T2  (e.g.,  Nieuwenstein, 
2006)  or  by  including  distracting  tasks  (see  above),  may  
alleviate  the  T2  deficit.  The neuroimaging evidence that AB 
manipulations recruit the frontal-parietal attentional networks of the 
brain (Hommel et al., 2006; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005) adds further 
weight to the view that, first and foremost, the attentional blink 
Figure XXIV: 
B&B: sparing 
Figure XXIII: 
B&B: blink 
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represents a deficit of selective attention.” Similarly, Akyürek, 
Toffanin, and Hommel (2008, p.575) point out that “lag 1 sparing is 
presumably associated with two logically related but nevertheless 
different processes: integration into the same episodic file and 
competition within this file”.  
As can be seen by this overview of the literature, there still is a 
heated controversy on what underlying mechanisms cause the time-
course of the attentional blink. However, it seems that one critical – 
and the most controversial – point is the explanation of lag-1 sparing. 
Is it due to a sluggishly closing gate and episodic integration? Or is it 
due to delayed attentional enhancement?  
In the majority of our own research, we have created conditions for 
which these different theoretical approaches on lag-1 sparing make 
different predictions. To this end we did not concentrate on target-
identification accuracy at lag 1, but instead investigated the 
accompanying phenomenon that the reported targets are often 
perceived in the wrong order (Olivers, Hilkenmeier & Scharlau, 2010; 
Hilkenmeier, Olivers, & Scharlau, 2011; Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, 
& Olivers, 2011). As can be seen in Figure 3, lag-1 sparing is indeed 
accompanied by a substantial proportion of temporal order reversals 
(Chun & Potter, 1995; Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Hommel & Akyürek, 
2005; Akyürek & Hommel, 2005). These order reversals were 
originally regarded as strong evidence in favor of episodic integration 
in a second stage of processing: when T1 and T2 are presented in 
close succession, they are processed as a single event – that is, they 
Figure XXV: 
B&B:  
rapid recovery 
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are merged into a single representation or receive a single memory 
trace, with a single time stamp (e.g. Bowman & Wyble, 2007; 
Akyürek, Riddell, Toffanin, & Hommel, 2007; Hommel & Akyürek, 
2005; Akyürek, Toffanin, & Hommel, 2008). Therefore the actual 
temporal order between the targets is lost, leading to an increase in 
order errors (e.g. Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995). 
     
Figure 3: typical time course of order reversals found in RSVP. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean. The data are taken from 
the 100 ms / item condition of the “RSVP-Speed” experiment 
described later in this manuscript. 
 
Temporal order errors are consistent with theories of attentional 
enhancement as well: one of the more intriguing effects of attentional 
enhancement is that it can alter the perceived order of the stimuli 
presented. That is, an attended stimulus can overtake a like, but 
unattended stimulus in the race to awareness, an effect commonly 
known as “prior entry” (Titchener, 1908).  If lag-1 sparing in the 
attentional blink is due to a somewhat delayed attentional 
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enhancement in a way that T2 benefits from attentional facilitation 
originally triggered by T1, this should not only lead to increased 
identification accuracy for T2, but, based on prior entry, to a 
substantial amount of target-order reversals.  
In sum, the basic finding of order reversals with both targets being 
presented within about 100 ms is consistent both with an episodic 
integration account as well as with an attentional enhancement 
account. We have come up with a cueing design that can 
differentiate between these two theoretical approaches. 
Before I get to the prior-entry account and the related cueing 
experiments in more detail, I will, in a classic psychophysical sense, 
test the phenomenon of order reversals under a wide variety of 
conditions, i.e., study “the effect on a subject's experience or 
behavior of systematically varying the properties of a stimulus along 
one or more physical dimensions” (Bruce, Green, & Georgeson, 
1996, p.462). This means, I will discuss which factors do and do not 
influence the proportion of order reversals and offer a theoretical 
explanation for these results. Afterwards, I will explicate the prior 
entry account in more detail, speculate what might open and close an 
integration episode; and present empirical findings that strongly favor 
the attentional over the integration explanation.  
To start, I will discuss one objection that is essential for most of the 
claims made in the rest of this manuscript: In the original AB 
paradigm and in the vast majority of all published AB studies since, 
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the participants’ only task is to identify the two targets. To reliably 
compute the proportion of order errors, it is necessary to modify this 
task and ask participants to report the two targets in the perceived 
order. One might object that this is a more demanding task or even 
that it is a dual task: first identify the targets and then make a 
judgment about their order of appearance. Therefore, it might be that 
the task utilized in the experiments reported here is not strictly 
equivalent to the standard attentional blink task and thus our results 
will not be transferable to the AB paradigm as such (see e.g. Visser, 
Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999 for influences on the AB task). For two 
reasons I am confident about this objection being invalid and that the 
AB with explicit order task is equivalent to the AB without explicit 
order task. For one, in Chun and Potter (1995) participants were 
encouraged but not required to report the targets in the perceived 
order (p. 118f). Nevertheless the time course of order reversals 
reported by these authors looks strikingly similar to the time course 
when participants are asked to report the targets in the correct order 
(Compare Figure 8 in Chun & Potter, 1995 to Figure 1 in Hilkenmeier 
& Scharlau, 2010; Figure 3 in Akyürek & Hommel, 2005a; Figure 2 in 
Akyürek, Toffanin, & Hommel, 2008). This suggests that participants 
report the targets in the order they perceived them in any case, 
regardless of the fact whether they were explicitly asked to do so or 
not. Secondly if the explicit order task differs from the basic 
identification task, it must be more demanding, especially at short 
inter-target intervals. This would suggest that identification 
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accuracies of the targets suffer in comparison to when the 
participants’ only task is to identify the two targets. A visual 
comparison of the time course of T1 performance and the conditional 
T2 performance suggests that this is not the case (compare e.g. 
Figure 2 in Chun & Potter, 1995 to Figure 1 in Hilkenmeier & 
Scharlau, 2010; Figure 1 in Akyürek & Hommel, 2005; Figure 1 in 
Akyürek, Toffanin, & Hommel, 2008).  
Nevertheless I explicitly designed one control-experiment to test the 
before raised objection. In two successive blocks participants were 
asked to identify the two targets. In one block the instruction 
emphasized that the targets had to be reported in the correct order. 
In the other block the instruction stated that they could give their 
report in any order they wanted. The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced between subjects.  
 
Figure 4: Results of the “explicit order” control experiment as a 
function of lag and condition. Left: conditional T2 accuracy. Right 
(top): T1 accuracy. Right (bottom): proportion of order reversals. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Figure XXVI: 
summary of 
experiment 
“explicit order” 
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As can be seen in Figure 4, there is no significant difference for the 
conditional T2 accuracy or the proportion of order reversals between 
the two conditions. Dealing with null-effects is not easy, especially 
when, as in this case, the null-result is the desired one. Whether a 
result reaches significance or not depends on a number of factors 
including the population effect size and the number of subjects tested 
(“Never use the unfortunate expression ‘accept the null hypothesis’”; 
Wilkinson & the Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999, p. 599). 
When the number of subjects is small, it is less likely to reject the 
null-hypothesis, even if there is a true difference in the underlying 
population. Luckily, power analyses can provide us with an estimate 
of the minimum sample-size required to detect an effect of an a priori 
determined size with certain likelihood. For this experiment the a 
priori determined likelihood to find an effect of at least medium size 
exceeded 90% (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang; 2009; for effect 
sizes see Cohen, 1988). Therefore, it is relatively safe to assume that 
the additional order judgment does not influence the attentional blink 
too much. A closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that the 
identification accuracies are higher in the “dual task” condition: There 
is a significant main effect of condition for T1 accuracy, meaning that 
T1 identification is better when subjects were asked to report both 
targets in the correct order. It is hard to make perfect sense out of 
this result, but the import message here is that the AB task with 
additional order instruction is not more demanding than the AB task 
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without this instruction. In the following, I will work under this 
premise.  
After concluding that the additional order-judgment task has no major 
effect on the primary target-detection task and therewith the time-
course of the attentional blink, I will look at that relationship the other 
way round: Before participants can judge the order of events, they 
first have to go through a demanding identification process. It is thus 
possible that they have little resources left for the actual order 
judgment. In other words, the high demands of the target-
identification task might have inflated the number of order reversals. 
Participants might simply do not have the resources to deal with both 
tasks at the same time. This would explain the relatively high amount 
of order reversals after 100 ms. In other experimental paradigms as 
for instance the temporal order judgment (TOJ), a delay of 100 ms 
between the target stimuli is usually sufficient for a correct order 
judgment (e.g. Scharlau, 2002; Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 
2006; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; Weiß & Scharlau, 2011). 
However, as pointed out in Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, and Olivers 
(2011) one of the main differences between a typical TOJ task and a 
typical AB task are the higher task demands for the latter one. We 
conducted several experiments to investigate the influence of task 
demands on the proportion of order reversals, all with the same, 
unexpected result: When the task-set is smaller and the identification 
demands are therefore lessened, participants make more order 
reversals, not less.  
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When subjects were asked to either report two target digits in the 
correct order, out of all possible digits (2 out of 9), or to report 
whether a “5” or a “7” appeared first (1 out of 2), they made less 
order reversals in the former condition than in the latter.  
 
Figure 5: order reversals as a function of lag and task-set size. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean.  
 
One could argue that this difference is due to guessing. In the 
standard AB task (i.e., 2 out of 9) guessing has a rather limited 
influence. Given a participant has only seen one target and has to 
guess the other one, chances of a correct guess are one out of eight. 
When the guess is wrong, this trial will not be taken into account for 
the computation of order reversals. Even when the guess is correct, 
there is still a “fifty-fifty chance” for the reported order being correct or 
not. When the participant has not seen any target, the chances of 
producing an order reversal are even lower. In the “1 out of 2” 
condition the influence of guesses are much higher, as can be seen 
in the following example: 
Figure XXVII: 
summary of 
experiment  
“task-set” 
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Imagine that correct order and incorrect order are guessed equally 
often (which isn't even necessarily the case considering the small 
number of repetitions we use). Case 1: a subject is only certain about 
her order judgment in 20% off all cases. In the remaining trials she 
has either seen only one target or no target at all. Of these 20%, the 
order is perceived incorrectly in 35% (i.e. 7 percentage-points). In the 
remaining 80% of trials, she guesses the order (50% correct, 50 % 
incorrect). Since she can only choose between “5” and “7”, her guess 
will in any case be taken into account for the proportion of order 
reversals (either as a correct answer or as an order reversal). That 
leaves her with 47 percentage-points order reversals.  
 
Figure 6: Distribution of perceived order and guesses for two 
hypothetical cases. Even though the proportion of perceived correct 
order and perceived incorrect order is identical in both cases, the 
measured proportion of order reversals is higher for the case with 
more guesses.  
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Case 2: a subject is certain about his order judgment in 80% of all 
cases. Of that 80%, the order is again incorrect in 35% (i.e. 28 
percentage-points). In the remaining 20% of trials, he guesses the 
order (50% correct, 50% incorrect). All of his guesses will be taken 
into account as well. That leaves him with 38 percentage points order 
reversals. Despite the proportion of actual perceived order-reversals 
being equal (35%), the measured order reversals differ considerably 
(47% to 38%). 
To conclude: the more a participant guesses in the “1 out of 2” 
condition, the higher the proportion of reported order reversals. Thus, 
the results presented here might be due to a methodological artifact. 
However, the results do not change even when we control for 
guessing by using a ternary TOJ task and giving participants the 
opportunity to refrain from their judgment (see Ulrich, 1987). 
Participants rarely use the third “uncertain” judgment category, but 
indicate that they perceive the targets in a distinct order. 
Interestingly, they still make more order reversals in the easier task 
with less target-alternatives (Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, & Olivers, 
2011, Experiment 1f). This leaves us with a very puzzling result, 
though the important message here is that order reversals do not 
increase when the task demands of the primary target-identification 
task increase.  
A further control experiment showed that order reversals do not vary 
in respect of stimulus-duration / inter-stimulus-interval variations, 
given the overall stimulus onset asynchrony remains constant.4  
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Thus, presenting the items, especially the targets, without any ISI 
does not increase order reversals, even though one might assume 
that the temporal separation is less clear (and therefore integration is 
more likely to occur) when the targets are presented right next to 
each other compared to when they are separated by an inter-
stimulus interval (Chua, personal communication).  
Moreover, this result is well in line with Coltheart’s finding regarding 
visible persistence (1980), showing that briefly presented stimuli are 
perceived up to 100 ms when they are not overwritten by subsequent 
masks (also see Sperling, 1960; Keysers & Perrett, 2002). According 
to Bloch’s law, these “persistent” stimuli should have been perceived 
rather gray than pure black. Anyway, it seems as if this had not 
influenced identification accuracies either.   
 
Figure 7: results of the “SD_ISI Variation” control experiment. Left: 
Proportion of order reversals. Right: T1 and conditional T2 accuracy. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. As can be seen, 
variations in stimulus duration and inter stimulus interval do not have 
any major influence on target detection or perceived order. 
 
Figure XXVIII: 
summary of 
experiment  
“SD_ISI variation” 
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All in all, the experiments reported so far indicate that order reversals 
are not the result of too high task demands and that the AB as such 
is not influenced by the additional order-judgment task. 
Next, I will tackle the question whether order reversals between T1 
and T2 are due to T2 being the next item in the stream or due to the 
temporal distance between the two targets. As Bowman & Wyble 
(2007; also see Potter, Staub & O’Connor, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, 
Gilzenrat, Holmes & Cohen, 2005) evidenced, the so-called “lag 1 
sparing” is not constrained to the lag 1 position, but to about 100 ms 
Target Onset Asynchrony (TOA). They tested this by speeding up the 
RSVP stream to about 20 items / second. This means that when T2 
was presented at lag 2, it was only presented 100 ms after T1.  
Unfortunately, these authors did not report order reversals, hence it 
is unclear whether this temporal misperception will spread to the 
T1+2 position as well, provided the temporal distance between the 
two targets is still around 100 ms. To test this, I chose a design close 
to Bowman and Wyble (2007) and manipulated the speed of the 
RSVP stream as well. In addition to the “50 ms” condition and the 
“100 ms” condition utilized by Bowman and Wyble, I also employed 
an intermediate “75 ms” condition as well as a “150 ms” condition. As 
can be seen in Figure 8, I was able to replicate Bowman and Wyble’s 
finding about lag-1 sparing spreading to lag 2 as long as it came 
within about 100 ms of T1 onset. There are some discrepancies 
between the result found in our lab and the ones reported by 
Bowman and Wyble, but the important finding in the present context 
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is that temporal order reversals between T1 and T2 can indeed 
spread to later lags, and are not bound to situations in which T1 and 
T2 are presented right after each other. As with lag-1 sparing, the 
important variable seems to be the temporal distance between T1 
and T2, and not the number of intermediate distractors between 
them. 
 
Figure 8: Results of the “RSVP-Speed” experiment as a function of 
RSVP speed and target onset asynchrony. Top: conditional T2 
accuracy. Bottom: proportion of order reversals. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
What is surprising in this context is the finding that at the same TOA 
there are more order errors for faster presentation speeds. This 
Figure XXIX: 
summary of 
experiment  
“RSVP-Speed” 
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means that there are more order reversals even though the targets 
are delineated by more intermediate distractors. For instance, at a 
TOA of 200 ms, T1 and T2 are delineated by one distractor in the 
standard 10 Hz stream condition, but delineated by three distractors 
in the faster 20 Hz condition. Nevertheless, there are significantly 
more order reversals in the latter compared to the former condition. 
This brings us to our next aspect: the importance of backward 
masking. The presentation speeds employed in this experiment do 
not only differ in the number of distractors between the targets at a 
given TOA, they also systematically vary in the strength of backward 
masking. The different RSVP speeds were realized by varying the 
inter stimulus interval. This means that the stimulus duration was set 
to 50 ms in all conditions. In the “50 ms” condition the ISI was 
therefore 0 ms, whereas it was 50 ms in the “100 ms” condition. As a 
result, the distractor trailing the second target came much quicker in 
the “50 ms” condition than it came in the “100 ms” condition, 
impairing the visibility of T2. This impaired visibility indirectly causes 
the higher proportion of order reversals: Note that for the 
computation of order reversals we only take trials into account in 
which both targets are identified. So in the trials that we consider, 
backward masking did not hinder T2 on being identified. In the 
relatively hard “50 ms” condition this might indicate that the identified 
T2s are strongly activated (elsewise, they would not get identified in 
the first place). These strongly activated T2s then (because they are 
so strongly activated) often win the race to awareness against T1, i.e. 
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they are perceived as earlier. When backward masking is weaker, as 
for instance in the “100 ms” condition, also less activated T2s get 
identified. These T2s race against their respective T1s as well, but 
they more often lose this race to awareness, i.e. T1 is perceived as 
first and T2 is perceived as second, leading to a reduction in the 
relative proportion of order reversals.  
The order-error results of the already described “T2+1 blank” 
experiment (see Figure 2) are consistent with this interpretation as 
well: When the distractor trailing T2 is omitted, backward masking is 
much weaker. This leads to better T2 performance (presumably 
because less activated T2s get identified as well, since they have 
more time to save themselves from becoming overwritten) and also 
to a reduction in the proportion of order reversals (presumably 
because these weakly activated T2s cannot make up for the 
headstart T1 has in the race to awareness).  
There are a number of other findings from our lab that can also be 
interpreted in the light of T2 backward masking: For instance, the 
proportion of order reversals at lag 1 is significantly lower when T1 
and T2 are both colored in red, compared to when all stimuli are 
black. This is possibly due to the fact that when T2 is red and the 
T2+1 distractor is black, backward masking is weaker compared to 
when both T2 and the T2+1 distractor are black. This difference 
between colored targets and black targets is gone when target-color 
and distractor-color are isoluminant and backward masking thus 
does not differ between these conditions (also see Shih & Reeves, 
Figure XXX: 
summary of 
experiment  
“target_colors” 
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2007). Additionally, in these conditions forward masking for T2 
remains nearly identical. In both cases the T1 stimulus has the same 
color as T2. This does not mean that forward masking does not play 
any role for order reversals; but, as also indicated by the already 
discussed T2+1 experiment, it shows that manipulating backward 
masking is sufficient to influence the proportion of order reversals. 
 
Figure 9: Results of the “target colors” experiment as a function of 
color condition. Left: proportion of order reversals. Right: T1 and 
conditional T2 accuracy. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
Another piece of evidence comes from an experiment in which we 
compared conditions with targets in one location to targets in 
different locations, both with and without surrounding distractors. In 
both cases order reversals significantly increased when the target 
were presented among distractors. In this experiment I cannot 
disentangle the effects of forward masking and backward masking, 
but the result can again be interpreted in light of the backward-
masking hypothesis. Later on, I will come back to the issue of targets 
at the same location versus targets at different locations, but for the 
moment let us consider another possible implication of this data: 
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Figure 10: Results of the “single vs. dual stream” experiment as a 
function of condition and target onset asynchrony. Left: proportion of 
order reversals. Right (top): T1 accuracy. Right (bottom): conditional 
T2 accuracy. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
  
In Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, and Olivers (2011) we argued that 
one of the main differences between the temporal-order judgment 
paradigm (TOJ) and the AB paradigm is the size of the task set. 
Therefore, it seemed plausible that the higher identification demands 
in the AB task lead to the significantly higher proportion of order 
reversals compared to similar temporal distances in the TOJ task. 
However, as was shown there as well as in the present manuscript, 
the size of the task set did not influence the proportion of order 
reversals in the hypothesized direction. On the contrary: order errors 
increase with smaller task set size. Thus, this factor cannot explain 
the difference between TOJ and AB. Another obvious difference is 
the presence of distractors in the AB task and their absence in the 
TOJ task: When the TOJ task is modified to include distractors as 
well, order errors increase to a similar level as in the AB task. On the 
Figure XXXI: 
summary of 
experiment  
“single vs. dual   
stream” 
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other hand, when the AB task is modified in a way that distractors are 
omitted, order reversals decrease to a similar level as in the TOJ 
task. Further research is needed, but it seems that the presence or 
absence of distractors (and especially the T2+1 distractor) is one of 
the key differentiators between the TOJ and the AB task.  
Let us return to the aspect of same target location vs. different target 
locations: As can be seen in Figure 10, the proportion of order 
reversals is higher when the two targets are at different locations. 
This is true both for conditions with surrounding distractors and for 
conditions without distractors. In fact, the absolute amount of order 
errors (i.e. not divided by the number of trials in which both targets 
are identified, but divided by the absolute number of trials per 
condition) does not differ between the single-stream with distractors 
and the dual stream with distractors (t<1). Even though subjects have 
additional information (location), they cannot use this information to 
accurately determine the temporal order of events. On the contrary, 
the actual order judgment is even worse. This finding seems odd in 
light of Spence and colleagues’ results, which evidenced that 
redundant spatial information can facilitate temporal discrimination 
(Spence, Baddeley, Zampini, James & Shore, 2003; Zampini, Guest, 
Shore, & Spence, 2005). However, at least the conditions with 
distractors of the present experiment can again be explained in the 
light of target strength. Consider the following example: at the 
beginning of the trial attention is (or at least: should be) at fixation 
between the two streams. When T1 is presented at the left stream, 
Figure XXXII: 
representation of 
the 4 different 
conditions in  
“single vs. dual   
stream” 
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attention shifts to that location. When T2 is presented at the right 
stream shortly after (keeping in mind that in this experiment the 
maximum TOA was 200 ms), attention again has to switch its 
location. A weakly activated T2 is therefore often missed. When T2 is 
strongly activated, it will get identified as well. And because it is so 
strongly activated, it again has a better chance of overtaking T1 in 
the race to awareness. On the other hand, when T1 and T2 are in the 
same stream, also less activated T2s get identified (after all, attention 
does not have to change locations). But again, these lesser activated 
T2 more often lose the race to awareness against T1. The finding 
that the absolute number of order errors does not differ between the 
two conditions with distractors seems to corroborate this hypothesis: 
in addition to the strongly activated T2s, more weakly activated T2s 
get identified when T1 and T2 appear at the same location. These 
weakly activated T2s increase the conditional T2 performance, but 
they are too weak to overtake T1 in the race to awareness, i.e. the 
absolute number of order reversals remains constant, but the relative 
proportion of order reversals decreases. The same is true for the 
already described RSVP-Speed experiment: for example, the 
absolute number of order reversals at a TOA of 100 ms does not 
significantly differ between the “50 ms condition” and the “100 ms 
condition”. The relative proportion of order reversals in the latter one 
is lower because the weaker masking of T2 leads to a higher T2 
performance.  
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The idea of target strength is not a new one. It is incorporated in 
several theories of the attentional blink, for instance the interference 
model (Shapiro et al., 1994), the attention cascade model (Shih, 
2008, 2009; also see Reeves & Sperling, 1986) or the eSTST model 
(Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009, also see Bowman, Wyble, 
Chennu, & Craston, 2008; Wyble & Bowman, 2005). The target 
strength I propose here has a different twist than the definitions of 
target strength before: In Wyble et al. (2009, p.9; Figure 11) replacing 
the T2+1 distractor with a blank increases the target strength of T2, 
leading not only to a reduced blink but also to an increment in the 
proportion of order reversals (see Figure 11 for simulations of the 
eSTST model).5, 6  
Figure 11: Order error, T1 performance, and T1&T2 performance 
simulations of the eSTST model as a function of target onset 
asynchrony. Left (top): standard attentional blink with 10 items / sec. 
Right (top): attentional blink with 20 items / sec. Left (bottom): 10 
items / sec stream, but the T2+1 distractor is replaced by a blank.  
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This means that target strength is directly bound to visibility of a 
target. Here, I suggest decoupling this relationship. The longer a 
target is visible, the greater the chances of that target of becoming 
processed. This is well in line with a number of findings reported here 
(e.g. the T2+1 blanks experiment or the RSVP-Speed experiment) as 
well as in the literature (e.g. Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998; also see 
Wyble et al., 2009, p. 9).  This visibility, which can only be 
determined after stimulus offset (or, more precisely, after the stimulus 
is backward masked) does not necessarily translate to target 
strength. Target strength might be determined within a shorter time-
span, even before stimulus offset. A similar approach was taken by 
Olivers and Meeter (2008). Their computational model only takes the 
sensory activity during the first 15 ms of presentation as a measure 
of perceptual strength of a stimulus (in their model this strength is 
used to determine the amplitude of the boost or the bounce, 
respectively). Only this target strength, which is determined shortly 
after onsets of the targets, is relevant for the perceived temporal 
order of the targets. Variations in target length or post target masking 
effects only influence the visibility of a target (and therefore have a 
strong influence on target performance), but not its strength. In terms 
of the attention cascade model (Shih, 2008; 2009, personal 
communication) this means that the temporal order is determined by 
the initial strength value and not, as proposed by Shih, by the 
weighted strength at the end of the consolidation process. All 
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empirical data presented in this manuscript so far, especially the 
order reversal data, are explainable within this definition of strength. 
Later on, I will introduce a basic computational model that was drawn 
up to account for the distribution of order reversals in Hilkenmeier, 
Scharlau, Weiß, and Olivers (2011). This model can also account for 
a number of order-reversal findings presented here and is largely 
compatible with this definition of target strength. I will discuss the 
computational model in more detail when I present the findings of 
Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, and Olivers (2011).  
As just described, many AB theories that subscribe to the concept of 
target strength hypothesize that this strength is determined at the 
end of a consolidation process in which T1 and T2 are both 
processed within the same batch (Shih, 2008, p. 214, p. 219; Shih, 
2009; Akyürek, Toffanin, and Hommel, 2008 p. 575; Shapiro et al., 
1994; Bowman & Wyble, 2007). In the following, I will argue that it is 
not necessary to assume such a late determination of perceived 
order. In fact, it is not necessary to assume episodic integration 
within a common batch at all.  
The theoretical framework for this claim is the already outlined Boost 
and Bounce theory of temporal attention (Olivers & Meeter, 2008). As 
other recent theories about the attentional blink this model assumes 
that a task-relevant event (e.g. a target among distractors) starts a 
transient attentional enhancement (in the standard attentional blink 
task that stimulus is T1). This  attentional “boost” is delayed: it starts 
about 25 ms after stimulus detection and peaks another 75 ms later 
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(i.e. at around 100 ms; also see Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Nakayama 
& Mackeben, 1989; Wyble, Bowman, & Potter, 2009; Reeves and 
Sperling, 1986 for earlier implementations of transient attentional 
enhancement). Due to the temporal characteristics of the RSVP 
paradigm, T1 is already overwritten by the next item when most of 
the additional attention arrives. In case of Lag 1, this post-T1-item is 
T2. Thus T2 receives even more attention than T1 and can therefore 
easily outperform T1. Put differently: the attentional facilitation, 
originally triggered to ensure T1 processing, “accidentally” enhances 
the target strength of T2 and leads to higher identification accuracies 
for the second target. In this sense, attention can manipulate target 
strength.   
As discussed previously, target strength determines the perceived 
temporal order between the two proximal targets. This means that 
the delayed attentional enhancement which accidentally hits T2 can 
account for the substantial number of trials in which T2 wins the race 
to awareness. The mechanics and timing of the gating mechanism 
assumed in B&B theory (or, for that matter, in any other theory of 
transient attentional enhancement) are thus ample to explain the 
order errors and lag-1 sparing.  
This explanation of order errors implies that a relative shift of 
attention in favor of one of the targets should have an impact on the 
amount of order errors as well, a hypothesis well in line with one of 
the “fundamental laws of attention”: prior entry.  As I briefly touched 
previously in this manuscript, the law of prior entry states that “the 
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object of attention comes to consciousness more quickly than the 
objects that we are not attending to“ (Titchener, 1908, p. 251). The 
prior-entry effect was one of the initial topics of experimental 
psychological research. When Titchener included it into his seven 
fundamental laws of attention, he could already look back at more 
than 50 years of experimental research on that topic (Scharlau, 2007; 
Sternberg & Knoll, 1973). There are several theories explaining the 
phenomenon of prior entry, for instance the asynchronous updating 
model (Neumann & Scharlau, 2007a, b) or the temporal profile model 
(Stelmach & Herdman, 1991; for an overview, see Scharlau, 2007). 
Unfortunately, these theories as well as the models of Sternberg and 
Knoll (1973) cannot be applied to the RSVP design used in our line 
of research. The model of Sternberg and Knoll assumes that the two 
to-be-judged stimuli are presented in two independent channels 
(1973, p. 635, p. 659ff). These “channels” need not to be thought of 
as different modalities (p. 637). In the visual domain for instance, it is 
sufficient to assume that the two stimuli appear at two different 
locations. In RSVP all items appear at the same location and the 
targets usually belong to the same category. It is therefore 
implausible to assume that T1 and T2 are presented in different 
channels. Thus, the independent channel model cannot be utilized 
here.  
Likewise, the asynchronous updating model (Neumann & Scharlau, 
2007a, b) requires that the two target-stimuli are presented at 
different locations. Prior entry occurs because the precue presented 
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at one of the target-locations already directs attention towards its 
location (e.g. Scharlau, 2007, p. 679f). Again, in RSVP distractors 
and targets all appear at the same location, so the asynchronous 
updating model should assume that attention is already directed to 
that location before the first target even appears.  
In Stelmach and Herdman’s model (1991) attention is allocated to 
one of two locations by instruction. Thus, this model concentrates on 
the temporal profiles of the two target stimuli and how attention 
changes these two profiles (Stelmach & Herdman, 1991, Figure 10; 
Weiß & Scharlau, 2010, Figures 2 & 3). It is unclear how the model 
would deal with other forms of cueing. Would an additional cue get a 
temporal profile as well? Would it still change the temporal profile of 
the target in the same way? Would the temporal profile of the cue 
interact with the temporal profile of the target at the same location? 
Since these theoretical questions remain open, the model in its 
current form cannot be employed to the RSVP paradigm.   
Here, I focus on the perceptual retouch model (PRM, Bachmann, 
1989) since PRM is most compatible with the RSVP design 
employed in attentional blink studies (Bachmann & Hommuk, 2005). 
Moreover, PRM comes with a plausible neurophysiological basis 
which centers on the different nuclei of the thalamus. Later on, I will 
speculate how this neurophysiological basis can be used to account 
for the attentional blink as well.  
The PRM originated as a theory to explain nonmonotonic backward 
masking (Bachmann, 1984, p. 69), i.e. the phenomenon that when a 
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second stimulus (the "mask") is presented briefly (~ 30 – 80 ms) after 
another stimulus (the “target”), visibility of the first stimulus is often 
severely reduced (for an overview, see Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006, 
2007). According to Bachmann’s theory, backward masking as well 
as prior entry occur because of the asynchrony of two parallel 
afferent processes: On the one hand, there is specific processing 
(SP) which is fast, spatially precise and encodes the specific features 
of an object like color or orientation. The neurophysiological 
counterpart of the SP process for vision is the lateral geniculate 
nucleus / corpus geniculatum laterale (LGN / CGL), the first relay 
station for signals sent from the retina on their way to the visual 
cortex (e.g. Nolte, 2002).  
The other afferent process in Bachmann’s theory is the modulatory 
nonspecific activation (NSP). NSP is necessary to modulate the SP 
information, otherwise the SP information could not become 
consciously available. NSP acts like a spotlight equipped with an 
energy-saving lamp: As a spotlight, it not only illuminates a certain 
stimulus, but the area around it as well, i.e. it is spatially imprecise. 
As an energy-saving lamp, it also is not instantly on, but takes some 
time until it reaches its full energy, i.e. it lags 50 – 80 ms behind the 
SP.  Although assumed to operate faster, this delayed modulation 
has the same effect as the “boost” in Boost & Bounce theory or the 
“blaster” in eSTST: It enhances stimulus information, but not 
necessarily the ones (or at least not exclusively) that triggered the 
modulation. If a second stimulus is presented in close spatiotemporal 
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proximity, it benefits from this modulation as well and its latency to 
consciousness is shortened. On the neurophysiological side the NSP 
is represented by the intralaminar nuclei, the reticular nuclei (TRN) 
and the pulvinar. These nuclei do not participate directly in the 
operations of encoding the contents of specific sensory information, 
but modulate the level of activity in the LGN (Bachmann, Luiga, 
Põder, & Kalev, 2003, p. 283). Surprisingly, more than 90 % of 
synaptic inputs on the LGN are modulatory in nature (Van Horn, 
Erisir, & Sherman, 2000), meaning that there are relatively few 
synapses that get the basic visual information from the retina to relay 
cells. These few specific synapses can be adjusted by many weak 
modulatory synapses that can be combined in numerous ways to 
allow for many forms of modulation. The drastic disparity between 
synapses carrying actual content and synapses modulating that 
content suggests that the major role of the thalamus is not only to 
relay information, but to gate the flow of information to cortex 
(Sherman, 2006; also see Crick, 1984). Moreover, this process is 
highly efficient: For each relay cell in the LGN, there are roughly 160 
neurons in primary visual cortex (at least in the cat; Sherman, 2006). 
Thus, modifying the information flow at the level of the thalamus is 
much more efficient than doing so after the information has reached 
the cortex, making the thalamus an ideal starting-point for attentional 
processes. As already mentioned, the spatial resolution of the non-
specific nuclei is quite poor. Not only the specific receptive field of the 
SP is modulated (boosted) but also neighboring ones. As the LGN, 
           60 
 
the primary visual cortex is organized in retinotopic maps, meaning 
the NSP really modulates the actual neighboring receptive fields, i.e. 
the retinal area around the stimulus that elicited the SP and the NSP 
in the first place. This allows PRM to account for a number of spatial 
phenomena like the  illusory-line-motion (Figure VIII); the flash-lag-
effect, in which a briefly flashed object, which is aligned with a 
moving object is typically perceived as lagging behind the moving 
one; or the Fröhlich effect, in which a laterally moving object will 
appear not at its first physical position, but shifted in the direction of 
motion (see e.g. Bachmann, 1999, 2010, for the flash-lag effect also 
see Priess & Scharlau, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 12: Schematic view of the thalamus. Relevant nuclei for visual 
information processing and their projections to and from the cortex.  
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 All of the processes assumed in PRM can happen without attention. 
In PRM any stimulus, not just an attended one, elicits both the SP 
and the NSP process (Bachmann, personal communication); but 
there are several ways to incorporate attention into the model: For 
instance, attention could trigger extra NSP and thus facilitate the 
target stimulus. Returning to the metaphor of a spotlight equipped 
with an energy-saving lamp to describe the NSP-process, NSP + 
attention would mean that this energy-saving lamp now has 60 W 
instead of 40 W (NSP without attention). It is the same mechanism, 
only stronger. In the following, I will describe the effects of the 
additional attentional modulation on the perceived order of two target 
stimuli in close temporal proximity. 
To manipulate attention (and therewith target strength) in the RSVP 
paradigm, we chose a design with colored stimuli close to the ones 
used by Nieuwenstein and colleagues (Nieuwenstein, 2006; 
Nieuwenstein et al., 2005) and Olivers and colleagues (Olivers, van 
der Stigchel, & Hulleman, 2007; also see Olivers & Meeter, 2008, p. 
24 “rapid reversal of the blink”). The two target stimuli were colored 
letters, always presented right after each other in lag 1. Distractors 
were black letters and digits, preceding and trailing the two targets.  
In the crucial cueing condition, the distractor digit prior to T1 was 
colored as well, i.e., it carried one target-defining property (color), 
and one distractor-defining property (category).  
Analogous to T1 starting the enhancement and T2 benefitting from it 
in the standard AB, we hypothesized that the cue would start the 
Figure XXXIII: 
summary of the 
experiments in 
Olivers et al., 2010  
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enhancement and T1 should be the main profiteer from it. Thus, the 
relative attentional weights should shift in favor of the first target, 
resulting in less target-order reversals between T1 and T2. As 
predicted, we found significantly less order reversals in the cueing 
condition compared to a baseline condition in which the two targets 
were not preceded by a cue (Olivers, Hilkenmeier, & Scharlau, 2010, 
Experiment 1). The same was true for cue and T1 did not sharing the 
same color, showing that cueing can occur in the absence of shared 
features, as long as the cue carries a task-relevant property (Olivers, 
Hilkenmeier, & Scharlau, 2010, Experiment 3). Moreover, we found a 
substantial correlation between T2 accuracy and order reversals. 
Participants who reported T2 more often than T1 also showed a 
greater proportion of order reversals. In addition, the subjects that 
showed the strongest reduction in order reversals due to the cue 
also showed the strongest increase in T1 accuracy relative to T2 
accuracy in the same condition. These results suggest that, in line 
with the law of prior entry, order reversals at lag 1 are modulated by 
the relative proportion of attention received by the two targets: Order 
reversals occur when T2’s representation is strong enough to 
overcome T1 in the race to awareness.  
However, prior entry is not the only possible explanation for these 
data patterns. The findings of Olivers et al. (2010) are largely 
consistent with an episodic integration account: The colored precue 
matches a task-relevant aspect of the target stimulus. Thus, it is 
likely that the cue initiated an episode, particularly because the 
Figure XXXIV: 
Baseline and T1 cue 
condition used in 
Olivers et al., 2010 
Figure XXXV: 
Hypothesized 
attentional 
enhancement for the 
baseline and T1 cue 
condition 
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occurrence of a color singleton always was a valid predictor for the 
first target (it either was T1 or it was at least signaling the very 
imminent onset of T1). If we assume that episodes have a limited 
duration, the cue and T1 are most likely processed in one episode, 
but in most cases, T2 will come too late to be included as well. In that 
case, T2 will have to start its own episode. Then, order errors are 
less likely, as T1 and T2 are not part of the same event and thus not 
very vulnerable to temporal confusion (Hommel, personal 
communication). In this line of argument, T2 accuracy should 
decrease when T1 is precued, a finding that is indeed present in the 
data and cannot easily be explained by a straightforward prior-entry 
account. The argumentation in favor of episodic integration relies on 
a number of implications, though. For instance, as already 
mentioned, it requires that the episode has a limited duration; 
otherwise, the cue, T1, and T2 could all be part of the same episode, 
which would result in no difference between the cue and the baseline 
condition (a similar mechanism is assumed in the eSTST model of 
Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009. In there, the attentional 
episode remains open as long as task-relevant information, in this 
case colored items, come in). Moreover, this argumentation assumes 
that in a considerable number of trials T2 at lag 1 can trigger a 
second episode, such that T2 can be given its own cognitive time 
stamp. It is unclear why in this case T2 should be able to start a 
second episode while T1 is being consolidated, but not in the 
Figure XXXVI: 
precue and T1 are 
processed in one 
episode, T2 at lag 1 
manages to start a 
second episode and 
gets processed 
separately 
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standard attentional blink task, in which processing of T1 is said to 
cause the blink in the first place. 
Furthermore, note that in the precue as well as in the baseline 
condition the relevant T1 information occurs at exactly the same 
temporal position. Even if the episode starts early in the precue 
condition, it starts with an irrelevant distractor item. The T1 identity-
information is available only at the same moment as in the baseline 
condition. Thus, T1 consolidation (which is assumed to be the cause 
for the blink in most episodic integration theories) should not end 
faster in the precue than in the baseline condition,7 unless we 
assume that the precue somehow accelerates T1 processing. But 
such an acceleration would come close to the prior entry account 
championed here, namely the order of report being determined by 
the relative amount of attention each target gains (for more 
information regarding the episodic integration explanation see the 
General Discussion in Olivers, Hilkenmeier, & Scharlau, 2010).  
To summarize: the predictions of the prior entry account and the 
predictions of the episodic integration account for T1 precueing data 
are too similar and the results are too indecisive to exclude one of 
the theories just yet. Nevertheless, at the very least this first set of 
experiments shows that it is not necessary to assume episodic 
integration to explain order reversals in RSVP. The results can at 
least be equally well explained by prior entry and transient attentional 
enhancement.  
Next, I will present experimental conditions that will delineate the 
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prior entry predictions from the episodic integration predictions more 
clearly.  
To that end, we included conditions in which T1 and T2 are still 
presented right after each other at lag 1, but instead of T1, T2 is 
precued. In our interpretation of episodic integration this T2 cue 
should not influence the proportion of order reversals. After all, the 
T2 cue is presented after the episode already having started (elicited 
by T1). Since T1 and T2 are presented at the same temporal 
distance, episodic integration should occur to a similar degree, 
regardless whether an additional cue is presented in between or not. 
If, on the other hand, the temporal order of the two proximal targets is 
determined by the relative distribution of attention between them (as 
suggested by the law of prior entry), not only should precueing T1 
lead to decreased order errors, but, by the same token, precueing T2 
should lead to an increase in order reversals (see Hilkenmeier, 
Olivers, & Scharlau, 2011, p. 7 lines. 111 - 114).  
To integrate a cue in the temporal space between T1 and T2 at lag 1, 
we decided to present each stimulus twice in succession for half the 
usual presentation time. This allowed us to color each of the stimulus 
“halves” individually. In specific, we colored only the first halves (the 
first 50 ms) of each target stimuli. As in Experiment 3 of Olivers et al.  
(2010), the two targets always had different colors. For instance the 
first half of T1 was red, whereas the second half was black again. 
Then the first half of the following T2 was green and the second half 
of T2 again black. To precue T2, we colored the second half of T1 in 
Figure XXXVII: 
summary of 
experiment 1 in 
Hilkenmeier et al., 
2011 
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the same color as T2. We reasoned that, just like in a baseline 
condition without any additional cues, the attentional enhancement 
would be triggered by the first half of T1. But this enhancement 
should be reinforced by the colored second half of T2, resulting in 
more enhancement for the subsequent T2 and thus in a reduction of 
order reversals.   
As predicted by prior entry, the proportion of order reversals indeed 
increased when T2 was precued (Hilkenmeier, Olivers, & Scharlau, 
2011, Experiment 1). This result is again not limited to trials in which 
the cue and T2 share the same color, indicating that at least part of 
this effect must be attentional and not due to some kind of lower-level 
sensory priming (Hilkenmeier et al., 2011, Experiment 3).8   
The design employed in these experiments is vulnerable to one 
critical objection: As already described, in the baseline condition only 
the first half of T1 and the first half of T2 were colored. In between, 
the second half of T1 was presented in distractor-black. In the T2 
cueing condition on the other hand, the second half of T1 was 
colored as well, resulting in an uninterrupted sequence of colored 
(i.e. task-relevant) stimuli. One might object that in the baseline 
condition the “distractor-like” second half of T1 might have caused an 
early closure of the integration episode. Put differently, the 
integration episode might be prolonged in the T2 cue condition as 
long as task-relevant information was presented. In any case, this 
argumentation leads to the claim that the T2 cue condition utilized in 
Experiments 1 and 3 of Hilkenmeier et al. (2011) does not actually 
Figure XXXVIII: 
baseline and T2 cue 
condition used in 
Hilkenmeier et al., 
2011, Experiment 1 
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increase the proportion of order reversals, but that the baseline 
condition employed artificially underestimates the proportion of order 
errors.  
To counter this objection, Experiment 2 in Hilkenmeier et al. (2011) 
additionally included a modified baseline condition in which both 
halves of T1 and T2 were colored. As in the T2 cue condition, this 
modified baseline contained no distractor features between the two 
targets. According to our interpretation of episodic integration, this 
constant stream of “task-relevant information” should allow for a 
single, prolonged episode, just as in the T2 cue condition. Therefore, 
an episodic integration account should not predict any difference in 
order errors between this modified baseline and the T2 cue condition. 
These two conditions should significantly differ from the old baseline 
in which the second half of T1 was colored in distractor-black. 
Therefore the amount of order errors should be underestimated. Prior 
entry on the other hand predicts that the T2 cue should still enhance 
T2 processing relative to T1, and thus increase the number of order 
reversals regardless to which baseline it is compared to.  
The empirical data strongly support the prior entry hypothesis and 
refute the objection of the cueing results being due to the specific 
baseline condition utilized.  
As described at the beginning of this manuscript, the mechanisms 
underlying lag-1 sparing can be seen as key to understanding the 
attentional blink. Unfortunately, most empirical results regarding lag-1 
sparing can to some degree be interpreted both in light of episodic 
Figure XLI: 
old baseline 
Figure XXXIX: 
summary of 
experiment 2 in 
Hilkenmeier et al., 
2011 
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integration and in light of attentional enhancement. In our own 
experiments we chose not to focus on the phenomenon of lag-1 
sparing itself, but on the accompanying phenomenon of target order 
reversals.  
In our view, the present results cannot consistently be explained by 
episodic integration. Even though the reduction in order reversals 
when employing a T1 precue are fairly compatible with an integration 
account, it is hard to imagine how an increment in order reversals 
can be explained by episodic integration. Problematically, theories of 
the attentional blink that promote the idea of resource depletion 
cannot easily drop the assumption of episodic integration, since it is 
not only used to explain order reversals, but lag 1 sparing itself. 
When T2 at lag 1 cannot be processed together with T1, how can it 
be spared when T1’s hunger for resources should be maximal?  
The empirical evidence presented in Olivers et al. (2010) and 
Hilkenmeier et al. (2011) first and foremost indicates that order 
reversals in the RSVP paradigm are indeed best explained by the 
law of prior entry: An attended stimulus enters consciousness prior to 
an unattended one, i.e., attention alters the temporal features of the 
perceived stimuli. In Titchener’s words: “the stimulus, for which we 
are predisposed, requires less time than a like stimulus, to produce 
its full conscious effect” (Titchener, 1908, p.251).9 This means, the 
well known and reliable effect of prior entry does not only affect 
experimental paradigms with distributed spatial locations in which a 
cue draws attention to a certain location. It can equally well be 
 
Figure XLI: 
old baseline 
 
Figure XL: 
modified baseline 
Figure XLII: 
T2 cue 
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applied to temporal attention paradigms in which stimuli all appear at 
the same location but at distinct moments in time. Importantly, the 
effects of attention on the perceived order of events are not restricted 
to experiments conducted in our own labs. After reanalyzing some of 
the data of Akyürek, Abedian-Amiri, and Ostermeier (2011), the 
same effect is visible in that data as well (Akyürek, personal 
communication), even though that experiment was designed for a 
different purpose and used a different kind of cue. This again 
emphasizes the influence of cueing on the relative attentional 
weights each target gets and thus the proportion of order reversals. 
To summarize, models that assume transient attentional 
enhancement offer straightforward explanation of key findings of the 
attentional blink: lag-1 sparing, the actual blink, and (thanks to prior 
entry) order reversals. All these aspects seem to be related to the 
relative strength of the respective stimuli. This strength can be 
manipulated in numerous ways, for instance, as done in the present 
experiments, by the deployment of attention. 
For the rest of this manuscript, I will work under the premise that 
order reversals in the RSVP paradigm can indeed be manipulated by 
attention, just as in paradigms with distributed locations.  
Next, I will tackle the time course of attentional facilitation. The 
reason for this is two-fold: first, theories of transient enhancement 
predict a distinct time-course: the facilitation should rise rapidly and 
reach its maximum somewhere around 100 ms. More precisely, the 
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PRM expects the maximum to coincide with the asynchrony between 
specific and nonspecific processes, which is hypothesized between 
50 – 80 ms. eSTST and B&B stay in line with earlier results of Müller 
and Rabbitt (1989), Sperling and Weichselgartner (1995), and 
Nakayama and Mackeben (1989; also see (Kristjansson,  Mackeben,  
&  Nakayama,  2001;  Kristjansson  &  Nakayama, 2003) and predict 
the peak between 95 ms (Olivers & Meeter, 2008, p. 14) and 110 ms 
(Wyble, personal communication) after cue detection.  All theories 
hypothesize that facilitation should quickly decrease and be 
completely gone after a few hundred milliseconds.  
The few studies that systematically investigated the temporal aspect 
of prior entry (e.g. Scharlau, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 2006; Hikosaka, 
Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993; also see Scharlau & Neumann, 2003 b) 
found a more sustained time course. In Scharlau et al., (2006) the 
size of the prior-entry effect rose with cueing SOAs up to about 130 
ms, remained constant up to roughly 250 ms and then slowly 
decreased with some residual effect even after 1000 ms.  
However, all of these studies utilized different locations. Attention 
was either exogenously or endogenously directed to one of these 
locations. Therefore, their measure of the time course of prior entry 
might be confounded by a spatial switching component:  If the spatial 
shift to the new location takes longer than the temporal facilitation 
elicited by the cue, the peak of the measured facilitation is shifted to 
a later point in time (see the GD in Hilkenmeier, Weiß, Scharlau, & 
Olivers, 2011, for a extended discussion). Since in the present 
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paradigm all stimuli appear at the same location, we can measure 
the time course in the absence of any spatial switching effects. Thus, 
the present design may provide us with a purer estimate of the 
dynamics of prior entry.  
o study the time course of prior entry at one location, we again used 
the cueing paradigm already utilized in Olivers et al. (2010) and 
Hilkenmeier et al. (2011). While refining this paradigm for longer 
cueing SOAs, we encountered some difficulties. For one, we cannot 
employ this paradigm to measure the time course of any T2 cueing 
effect. Since all stimuli are presented at the same location, the T2 
cue has to be presented after the onset of T1. Otherwise, we cannot 
ensure that it only facilitates T2 and not “accidentally” facilitates T1 
as well. On the other hand, T1 and T2 have to be presented in close 
succession; or else the temporal distance becomes too large, 
resulting in hardly any reversals between the two targets. Thus, we 
are restricted to precueing T1. Still, which kind of cue should be 
used? Should the cue range over the complete cueing SOA, i.e. vary 
in length? Or should it have a fixed duration? If so, should the 
distractor items between cue and target be colored as well? Or 
should they be eliminated? Should the colors between cue and target 
change? Or stay the same? Should participants be able to refrain 
from their judgment in case they are uncertain? Do higher task-
demands influence the cueing effect? 
As it turns out, none of these factors (nor any tested combination) 
significantly influenced the time course of prior entry at one location. 
Figure XLIV: 
two of the cueing 
conditions used in 
Hilkenmeier, 
Scharlau et al., 2011 
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As can be seen in Experiment 1 of Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, and 
Olivers (2011), each type of cue led to qualitatively the same result: 
The peak of facilitation was always in the 50 ms cue condition. At a 
cueing SOA of 100 ms, there was virtually no facilitation left. A further 
experiment measuring on a finer time scale confirmed that the ideal 
cueing SOA seems to be quite early, somewhere between 30 and 50 
ms.  
 
Figure 13: proportion of order reversals for the “cueing on a finer 
scale” experiment. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
Moreover, the facilitatory effect is rather short-lived, with no 
significant reduction of order reversals for cueing SOAs longer than 
100 milliseconds. Obviously, this time course of prior entry is 
strikingly different from the one measured with distributed locations. 
This indeed suggests that studies utilizing a paradigm with different 
locations might overestimate the peak of prior entry facilitation.   
Figure XLIV: 
summary of 
experiment “cueing 
SOAs on a finer 
scale” 
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To evaluate whether these findings are in line with theories of 
transient enhancement, as opined by the author, we incorporated a 
basic computational model that captures the gist of this class of 
theories. More precisely, it is a simplified derivative of the recent 
boost and bounce theory (Olivers & Meeter, 2008), but omits more 
complex effects like masking and sustained activity. Basically, it 
consists of two parts: bottom-up saliency of the cue and the targets, 
which are modeled as gamma distributions peaking 40 ms after 
target detection; and transient attentional responses, which are 
modeled as gamma distributions peaking 90 ms after stimulus 
detection. 
The actual target evidence at a given point in time is operationalized 
as the cumulative product of the target’s bottom-up saliency and its 
transient response, multiplied by the transient responses of all 
preceding cues and targets. Due to this multiplicative approach the 
target evidence of T2 at lag 1 eventually overtakes the target 
evidence of T1. Precueing T1 can postpone the point in time at which 
target evidence of T2 surpasses target evidence of T1. The 
underlying hypothesis here is that the longer it takes T2 to overcome 
T1, the greater the chances of T1 entering working memory first.  
This model is also compatible with the distinction between target 
strength and target visibility. As stated earlier in this manuscript, 
target strength, which is relevant for the perceived temporal order, is 
determined earlier than target visibility, which is only determined after 
the offset of a target and is relevant for the identification 
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performance. With this distinction we were able to explain a number 
of empirical findings; for instance that omitting the T2+1 distractor 
leads to higher T2 accuracy, but not to a higher amount of order 
reversals (T2+1 blanks experiment, Figure 2, also see Figure 11 for 
modulations of the eSTST model). Figure 14 shows how our model 
would handle this data. The left panel shows a baseline condition in 
which each item is presented for 100 ms and immediately replaced 
by the following. The right panel shows the experimental condition in 
which the T2+1 item is replaced by a blank. This was done by 
extending the bottom-up saliency of T2 (bottom panels).10 As can be 
seen in the top-panels of Figure 14, the cumulative target evidence 
for T2 rises much higher when the distractor trailing T2 is replaced by 
a blank. I would argue that, in line with the empirical results, this 
higher target evidence leads to higher identification accuracies for 
T2.11 Importantly, although the cumulative target evidence of T2 
increases, the point in time at which T2 overtakes T1 does not 
change between these conditions. This means that the proportion of 
order reversals should not increase, which is also in line with the 
empirical data, but contrary to the model-simulations of eSTST.  
The simulations of our model also show that order reversals at lag 1 
increase with faster streams, exactly as the empirical evidence of the 
RSVP-Speed experiment suggests (Figure 8).12  
Importantly, the model can explain strong facilitatory effects as soon 
as 50 ms after cue onset, despite the attentional enhancement 
reaching its peak only 90 ms after cue onset. The reason for this is 
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that the bulk of bottom-up activity occurs during the first 50 ms. It is 
this bottom-up activity which interacts with the current attentional 
activity. Even if attention is not quite optimal yet, the product of the 
interaction is already some substantial activation. Thus, the early 
drop in order errors is in fact predicted by a straightforward transient 
attention model. 
 
Figure 14: simulations of the computational model. Left: standard AB 
with 10 items / sec. Right: The T2+1 distractor was replaced by a 
blank. From bottom to top: Bottom-Up Activity, Top-Down Response, 
Cumulative Target Evidence for T1 and T2, respectively. 
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The model predicts a substantial reduction of order errors also at 100 
ms cueing SOA, almost on a par with the effect for 50 ms. Clearly, 
this was not the case in Experiment 1 of Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, 
Weiß, and Olivers (2011), nor in the experiment investigating the 
cueing effect on a finer time-scale. The model predicts this time 
course because it treats the cue as if it was a normal target, and thus 
as if it triggered a full attentional response. Note that in the 
experiments reported so far, the cue was a distractor even though it 
carried the target color. It is therefore possible and perhaps even 
likely that the cue initially triggers an attentional response, but that 
upon detection of its distractor-like properties, either attention is 
rapidly disengaged (Theeuwes, 2010), or even suppressed (Olivers 
& Meeter, 2008).  
To account for such inhibitory effects, we allowed that a single 
stimulus cannot only trigger facilitation, but also delayed inhibition. 
The inhibition was modeled as the enhancement, only with a 
negative algebraic sign and 50 ms offset. With this additional 
assumption we were able predict the pattern found in Experiment 1of 
Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, et al. (2011), i.e. a peak of facilitation at a 
cueing SOA of 50 ms.  
In turn, this means that when we use a different and more task 
relevant cue that does not trigger such inhibition, the facilitation 
should extend to 100 ms. This is indeed what we found in 
subsequent experiments, employing a third target. In these 
Figure XLV: 
representation of 
the kinds of cues 
used in Experiment 
2 of Hilkenmeier, 
Scharlau et al., 2011 
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experiments, T2 and T3 were always presented right after each other 
(at lag 1, if you will), whereas the temporal distance between T1 and 
the target-pair was varied in the same way as the cue-T1 distance 
was varied in the previous experiments. T1 could be one of the digits 
“2,3,4,6,8,9”, whereas T2 and T3 always consisted of the digit pair 
“5,7”, or “7,5”. Since the cue-identity (T1) had to be reported, it was 
now highly task relevant. At the same time, by reducing the 
identification task of T2 and T3 to a temporal order judgment (“which 
one came first, the 5 or the 7?”) we kept the overall task demands 
relatively low (see the “Task-Set” experiment and the related 
discussion). With this experimental setup, the facilitation sustained to 
100 ms. There was no significant difference in order errors between 
the 50 and 100 ms cueing SOA. This suggests that the more task-
relevant cue (the additional target) extended, but not amplified the 
enhancement, just as predicted by the computational model.  
An alternative view is that the equal facilitation at 50 and 100 ms is 
the result of an overlay of two very different processes: a short-lived 
sensory priming effect and a somewhat slower starting attentional 
effect. In this view, the “distractor-like cue” just elicits the sensory 
effect since it is colored and therefore quite salient. There might be 
some developing attentional enhancement as well, but this 
enhancement is again stopped as soon as the system realizes that it 
is not dealing with a real target.  The “target-like cues” on the other 
hand profit from both the sensory priming (again, all targets are 
colored whereas the distractors are black) and the developing 
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attentional facilitation. Whereas the sensory effect again peaks at 50 
ms, the attentional effect peaks at 100. This results in the measured 
facilitation both at 50 and 100 ms cueing SOA. 
However, this explanation is unlikely. A further control experiment in 
which all stimuli were black (i.e. the targets are just defined by 
category, Experiment 3b in Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, et al, 2011) led to 
a qualitatively similar time course. Thus, a sensory priming effect 
induced by a color change cannot be responsible for our data 
pattern. In fact, we were unable to find any facilitatory effect of 
additional color information, as can be seen by the nonsignificant 
saliency x cueing SOA interaction in Experiment 3a of Hilkenmeier, 
Scharlau, et al. (2011); however, this might be due to a power 
problem.  
To sum up, the experiments of Hilkenmeier, Scharlau et al (2011) 
show a time course that is consistent with rapid and transient 
facilitation. In general, such boosts are predicted by perceptual 
retouch theory as well as recent theories of temporal attention in 
RSVP processing (e.g. eSTST, Wyble et al., 2009; B&B, Olivers & 
Meeter, 2008). The peak of facilitation was found at about 50 ms 
when using a task-irrelevant cue. Facilitation sustained to 100 ms 
with a task-relevant cue. Both of these results are consistent with a 
basic computational model which assumes that evidence for a target 
accumulates as a result of a rapid transient bottom-up signal, which 
is gated by a slower, but still transient top-down signal. The only 
additional assumption we have to make is that stimuli that carry a 
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distractor-defining feature cannot only trigger facilitation, but also 
inhibition. 
To my understanding, such inhibitory effects are not part of 
Bachmann’s perceptual retouch model, even though there is an 
obvious neurophysiological counterpart: As already discussed, 
Bachmann’s theory centers around different nuclei in the thalamus 
region. One of these structures is the reticular nucleus (TRN). Each 
information from the thalamus to higher-order structures in the cortex 
must project through this thin sheet of inhibitory neurons that form a 
capsule around the thalamus (see Figure 12). If some higher-order 
cortex area realizes that instead of a target, it actually deals with a 
colored distractor, it could very well project to the TRN to inhibit 
further input (as can be seen in Figure 12, the TRN receives 
projections from the cortex and in turn has inhibitory projection into 
the LGN, the relay station for visual information coming from the 
retina). In this way, the TRN would act like the bounce described in 
B&B theory. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that supports 
this view: For instance O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, and Kastner (2002) 
used fMRI to investigate attentional response modulation in the LGN. 
As expected, LGN activity was enhanced when subjects attended to 
the stimuli, but was also suppressed when they ignored them. 
Unsurprisingly, the V1 activity mirrored this pattern, but interestingly, 
the attentional effects in V1 were smaller than the ones in the LGN. 
O’Connor et al. (2002) argued that this indicates that LGN 
modulation must be influenced by factors other than cortico-thalamic 
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feedback from V1 to the LGN, and suggested a strong role of the 
TRN in this process. 
Another piece of evidence comes from McAlonan, Cavanaugh and 
Wurtz (2008). As already described, TRN has an inhibitory influence 
on the LGN. Thus, stronger LGN activity should be associated with 
lower TRN activity. That was exactly what these authors found when 
they recorded visually responsive neurons in the TRN and LGN of 
awake macaque monkeys performing a simple spatial attention task. 
Earlier results of the same authors (McAlonan et al., 2006) can also 
be interpreted in light of the modulatory TRN role. In this earlier 
study, monkeys had to attend to a tone while ignoring a visual 
stimulus or vice versa. This task increased the firing of the inhibitory 
TRN cells. I would argue that this increased TRN-firing was due to 
inhibiting (bouncing) the non-relevant dimension, but for now, this 
remains speculative. However, it would fit in well with the proposed 
view that TRN could represent the neurophysiological counterpart of 
the bounce in B&B theory: As long as no target-relevant stimuli are 
presented (either nothing or distractors in RSVP) there is medium 
TRN activity lightly inhibiting the visual information. When a target is 
presented, the TRN activity (and therewith the inhibition) is lowered. 
When a distractor is presented afterwards, TRN activity is amplified 
to inhibit that distractor. This hypothesis is further corroborated by the 
fact that the TRN modulation, just like the bounce, takes some time 
until it reaches its full effect (see McAloan et al., 2008). 
 81 
 
The integration of inhibitory effects into perceptual retouch (a retouch 
& bounce theory, if you will) would have some distinct advantages 
over the current PR model and B&B theory. By including a bounce, 
the PR model would be able to explain a number of recent RSVP 
findings, not only the time course of cueing presented here, but also 
the standard attentional blink, the rapid recovery of the blink, and the 
whole-report vs. partial report findings of Nieuwenstein and Potter 
(2006). Moreover, this more inhibitory role of top-down attention 
would fit in well with Belopolsky et al.’s (2010, p. 340) conclusion that 
“the primary role of the top-down set is to control the disengagement 
of attention from the features that do not match it.” By including the 
spatial fuzziness of perceptual retouch, B&B theory on the other 
hand would gain the ability to account for a number of spatial 
distributed phenomena as well, thus extending from the RSVP 
design to related paradigms as for instance the flash-lag-effect 
(Bachmann & Põder, 2001) or illusory line motion (Bachmann, 1999). 
Moreover, there is an upper limit of enhancement in PR. Once it is 
reached, further enhancing stimuli can just maintain the level of 
enhancement, but do not increase it any further. In my opinion, this is 
an advantage over B&B, where (at least in the computational model) 
every facilitatory stimulus just increases the level of enhancement, 
making it difficult to compute the influence of cueing on order 
reversals within this model.13  
One might object that the processes assumed in perceptual retouch 
are all relatively early. After all, the thalamus is the first relay station 
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of visual information coming from the retina. On the other hand, 
biasing or gating information is often seen as a higher order process 
that takes place in the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Miller, Erickson, & 
Desimone, 1996; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Awh & Vogel, 2008; Olivers 
& Meeter, 2008; but see Sherman, 2006; Crick, 1984). Maybe this 
apparent discrepancy is not so hard to overcome after all: as can be 
seen in Figure 4 of Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly (2006), thalamus and 
prefrontal cortex are connected via the basal ganglia in a complex 
loop. Thus, any activity in the thalamus is mirrored in the prefrontal 
cortex and vice versa, suggesting that early influences on the level of 
the thalamus could fit in with current empirical evidence and theory.  
One last experiment that can be seen as indication for such early 
influences on the attentional blink shall be discussed here: In a 
standard RSVP design, all stimuli are presented at the center of the 
screen to both eyes. By employing shutter glasses, we are able to 
present different visual information to each eye. We can present one 
item to only one eye whereas the other eye only sees grey 
background. This way, we can contrast conditions in which two 
consecutive stimuli were presented to the same eye, to conditions in 
which they are presented to different eyes. This means, we can 
selectively change masking on eye level, leaving other factors like 
stimulus duration, stimulus intensity, inter stimulus interval, and 
location all unchanged. This use of the shutter technique is a 
promising line of work since it enables us to disentangle different 
aspects of stimulus presentation that were previously confounded.  
Figure XLVIII: 
summary of 
experiment 
“monoptic/dichoptic 
blink” 
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As discussed earlier, masking has a strong influence on the 
attentional blink. Thus, the original purpose of this experiment was to 
explore the influence of early masking effects that occur before 
binocular integration (e.g. Lumer, 1998). As hypothesized, during the 
blink period (200 – 300 ms), the second target deficit was stronger 
when masking for T2 was stronger, i.e. when the distractors 
immediately preceding and trailing T2 were presented to the same 
eye, compared to when they were presented to the other eye.  
When the two targets were presented at lag 1 and both to the same 
eye (i.e., strong masking), conditional T2 performance was 
significantly higher than when the two targets were presented to 
different eyes (i.e., weak masking). Likewise, there were significantly 
more order errors when the two targets were presented to the same 
eye. 
 
 
Figure XLIX: 
representation of 
monoptic viewing 
condition used in 
“monoptic/dichoptic 
blink” 
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Figure 15: Results of the “monoptic/dichoptic blink” experiment as a 
function of viewing condition and lag. Left: conditional T2 accuracy. 
Right (top): T1 accuracy. Right (bottom): proportion of order 
reversals. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
   
As discussed previously, increased T2 accuracy combined with an 
increased proportion of order reversals is indicative for transient 
enhancement elicited by T1. Yet, the facilitation triggered by T1 only 
seems to hit T2 when the second target is presented to the same 
eye. When T2 is presented to the different eye, the facilitation does 
not reach it, indicating that the boost primarily uses monocular 
reentrant channels (Bachmann, personal communication). 
In this line of argumentation, these findings can be seen as some of 
the early thalamic effects described within Bachmann’s perceptual 
retouch model: T1 is presented to the fovea of the left eye, and even 
though the fovea has projections to both thalami, thalamo-cortical as 
well as cortico-thalamic retouch effects are laterally biased to the eye 
strong masking 
weak masking 
Figure XL: 
representation of the 
lags used inmonoptic 
“monoptic/dichoptic 
blink” 
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of the input (Bachmann, 2007, Bachmann, personal communication). 
As a consequence, the nonspecific modularly effect triggered by T1 
in the left eye is stronger for T2 when it is presented to the left eye as 
well, compared to when T2 is presented to the right eye. Again, this 
interpretation is not undisputed and further research in this direction 
as well as further controls are necessary. Nevertheless, the results 
indicate that early influences (occurring even before binocular 
integration) do play a role in the attentional blink and in RSVP 
processing as a whole. This suggests that merging the 
neurophysiological assumptions of perceptual retouch with the 
computational model of boost and bounce theory might be a 
promising line of work. 
To summarize: Selecting relevant over irrelevant information is one 
of the crucial functions of our brain. It allows us to efficiently deal with 
a limited number of objects while ignoring other information in our 
environment. The mechanisms that allow for this selection are 
collectively known as attention. How exactly attention works has 
been one of the major topics of psychological research since the 
days of Helmholtz and James. Much of the earlier work has 
concentrated on how attention is distributed in space.  Interest in the 
temporal aspects of attention has only risen in the last 25 years or 
so. To investigate the temporal dynamics of attention, the RSVP 
design, and especially its two-target version, has become a fruitful 
experimental paradigm.  
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In our own work we have taken a different approach. Instead of 
concentrating on target-identification accuracy, we investigated the 
proportion of temporal order reversals between the two targets. 
These order reversals were originally seen as strong evidence for 
episodic integration; however, we found that they can at least equally 
well be explained by transient attention, via the “law of prior entry”, 
thereby demonstrating that this law does not only apply to paradigms 
utilizing different spatial locations, but also to the RSVP paradigm in 
which all items are presented at one location but at distinct moments 
in time. After testing the influences of different manipulations such as 
task-demands, stimulus duration, presentation speed, or location on 
the proportion of order reversals, we created precueing conditions 
that lead to different predictions for resource-depletion/ episodic-
integration theories and transient-attention models.  
The present results do not decide the argument between resource-
depletion / episodic-integration on the one, and transient attention 
models on the other hand.14 However, they represent evidence that 
can much more easily be explained by transient attention than by 
episodic integration, indicating a strong role of the former one in the 
dynamics of serial visual processing. Thus, the results presented 
here can be seen as pieces of empirical evidence that inspired new 
research and have therefore added to the scientific progress. And 
this is really all one can aim for. To put it in Popper’s words (1945, p. 
12): “In science, we never have sufficient reason for the belief that 
we have attained the truth”. 
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Footnotes 
1)  
An alternative to the spotlight model is the so-called zoom-lens 
model (Erikson & St.  James, 1986). In analogy to the zoom lens of a 
photo camera, the size of the attentional focus can be adjusted. 
Instead of moving the attentional focus from one location to another, 
the system could simply “zoom out” to cover both spatial areas. 
However, as with the photo camera, zooming out means losing 
details, which in this context means that processing of an individual 
object takes longer the larger the focus of attention is.  
  
2) 
We will come back to rapid and transient deployment of attention in 
more detail to explain lag-1 sparing and order reversals in the 
attentional blink.    
  
3)  
 In attentional-blink studies, the temporal distance between the two 
targets is usually specified in “lag”. Lag refers to the serial position 
after T1. For instance, the stimulus presented at the T1+2 position is 
presented in “lag 2”. Since all stimuli in the RSVP stream are 
presented for the same duration (typically for 100 ms), lag can 
without further ado be converted in target-onset interval. The term 
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“lag-1 sparing” suggests that it is really only the first item after T1 that 
gets spared. However, studies that doubled the rate of presentation 
from 100 to 50 ms per item evidenced that sparing extends out to 
lag-2. That is, the second target is spared not because it is directly 
adjacent to T1, but because it occurs within 100 ms (e.g. Bowman & 
Wyble, 2007). Therefore, when I use the term “lag-1 sparing” I mean 
the unimpaired T2 accuracy within the first 100 ms after T1 
presentation.  
  
4)  
The post hoc power analysis estimated a power of about 80% to find 
a significant effect, assuming the effect size in our sample is equal to 
the effect size in the underlying population.  
  
5)  
The discrepancy between empirical and computational data is 
especially troubling for the eSTST theory, since modeling the T2+1 
blink data (or, more precisely the T2 end-of-the-stream data) was in 
particular emphasized by the authors.  
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6)  
A similar mechanism is assumed in Shih (2008, p. 214, p. 219). In 
there, the relative strength of two targets encoded in the same 
consolidation process determines the perceived temporal order. 
However, it is unclear whether T2 is processed in the same batch as 
T1 when the T2+1 distractor is omitted (Shih, personal 
communication). Therefore, it is possible that the attentional cascade 
model would predict less order reversals in the T2+1 blank 
experiment as well.  
  
7)  
On the contrary: A straightforward resource competition model would 
assume that the more difficult T1 is to detect, the stronger the 
inhibition for T2 should be. Since in the precue condition, the item 
immediately preceding T1 had the same color as T1. Thus, it was 
more similar to T1. Therefore, it should take longer until T1 is read 
out, resulting in a prolonged and deeper blink.   
  
8)  
Please note that such a lower-level mechanism would not even be 
problematic for the overall notion of target-strength. Brightness 
summation or priming could as well strengthen the representation of 
a target. The results at hand simply indicate that target strength can 
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be manipulated in absence of shared features between the cue and 
the target, stressing the influence of attention (see Hilkenmeier et al., 
2011, lines 522-529; also see Nieuwenstein, 2006).   
  
9)  
This does not necessarily mean that episodic integration plays no 
role in RSVP order errors; the existence of prior entry does not 
preclude the existence of integration. 
  
 
10) 
Omitting the T2+1 distractor could result in another bottom-up pattern 
as the one shown in Figure 14. Yet, the modeling turns out in a 
similar way for a number of different distributions as long as 
extending the visibility only influences the latter part of the pattern 
(the one where visibility actually changes) and not the overall 
distribution.  
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11) 
At this moment, target accuracies cannot be simulated within the 
simple computational model. But since the long-term goal is to 
integrate the order-error model back into the computational model of 
boost and bounce, the T2+1 blank experiment data could proof 
useful in testing that model and differentiate it from the latest 
implementation of eSTST.   
 
12)  
Unfortunately, I was not able to simulate any other data than lag 1, 
since the model does not account for items other than cues and 
targets. 
  
 
13)  
The computational model presented here and in Hilkenmeier, 
Scharlau et al. (2011) reduces the value of this statement. However, 
as long as the current model is not implemented in boost and 
bounce, this is still a valid point.  
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14)  
“Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory merely 
because facts contradict it. They normally either invent some rescue 
hypothesis to explain what they then call a mere anomaly or, if they 
cannot explain the anomaly, they ignore it, and direct their attention 
to other problems.”Lakatos, 1978, p.3 
  
 
  
           94 
 
Experiments 
 
T2+1 blank Experiment 
The purpose of this experiment was to test Bowman and Wyble’s 
(2007, p. 36) claim that inserting a blank after the second target 
would attenuate the blink. So far, empirical data for this specific 
hypothesis was not available, only data about T2 being the last item 
in the stream (Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 1998), which basically abolished 
the blink.    
Method  
Participants: Twelve students from Paderborn University, Germany 
with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course credits or €6 
an hour.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure: Stimulus generation and response 
recording were done using the Tscope programming library. 
Backgrounds were gray. After a blank period of approximately 1000 
ms, a 0.5 x 0.5˚ black fixation cross was presented for another 1000 
ms in the center of the display and replaced by a rapid stream of 15 
black digits and letters, presented in Courier New (approximately 0.8 
x 0.8˚ in size). The letters I, O, Q, S, and Z were excluded, as was 
the number 1. Each item was presented for 100 ms and then 
immediately replaced by the following item, resulting in 10 different 
items / sec. T1 was placed at position 4-9 in the stream. T2 followed 
at lag 1, 2, 3, or 6. The two target-digits were always different. In half 
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of the trials the distractor-letter immediately trailing T2 was replaced 
by a blank. Each lag was repeated 60 times: 30 times with a T2+1 
distractor and 30 times without one.  All trials were randomly 
intermixed into a single block lasting about 40 minutes. The 
participants’ task was to report the two target-digits in the correct 
order at the end of the trial; unspeeded, and with feedback.  
Results and Discussion 
T1 accuracy, conditional T2 accuracy and proportion of order errors 
as a function of lag can be seen in Figure 2, separately for the 
baseline and the T2+1 blank condition. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA showed no significant main effect of condition on T1 
accuracy (F < 1), nor a significant interaction of condition with lag (F 
< 1).  As expected, the main effect of lag was significant (F[3,33] = 
9.8, p < 0.05), showing the usual reduced T1 accuracy at lag 1. The 
same analysis on T2|T1 accuracy revealed significant main effects 
for condition (F[1,33] = 29.2, p < 0.05) and lag (F[3,33] = 3.9, p < 
0.05), as well as a significant interaction (F[3,33] = 8.0, p < 0.05). As 
can be seen in Figure 2, there was no blink when the T2+1 item was 
replaced with a blank. This confirms Bowman and Wyble’s prediction. 
However, the data do not fit that well into their computational model. 
According to the model (standard settings), the blink should be 
attenuated, but not abolished as when T2 is the last item in the 
stream. Contrast analyses confirm this picture: when using the 
values estimated by the computational model as contrast weights, 
the t-value becomes negative (-2.1), indicating that the trend in the 
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observed pattern is opposite to the one suggested by (e)STST. In 
fact, the values estimated when T2 is the last item in the stream fit 
our empirical results better (competing contrast analysis tdiff[11] = 
1.6, p < 0.05 one-tailed), but still far from perfect. Interestingly, 
omitting the T2+1 distractor also affected the proportion of order 
reversals. The repeated measures ANOVA showed significant main 
effects for condition (F[1,33] = 22.5, p < 0.05) and lag (F[3,33] = 26.4, 
p < 0.05), as well as a significant interaction (F[3,33] = 8.6, p < 0.05). 
One could assume that T2, which persists longer when the trailing 
distractor is omitted, is perceived as first more often since its visibility 
increases. But contrary to that, there are less order reversals when 
T2 is followed by a blank and is therefore more visible. This finding 
might also shine light on the order-error results of the “RSVP-Speed” 
Experiment. Order reversals increased when the RSVP stream was 
presented with higher speed. This was realized by shortening the 
inter-stimulus-interval, which in effect means that the T2+1 distractor 
is presented more quickly.   
To summarize, replacing the distractor immediately after T2 with a 
blank basically abolishes the attentional blink. Thus, the effect is 
much stronger than expected by Wyble and colleagues. It more 
closely resembles the condition in which T2 is the last item in the 
stream and not backward masked at all (Giesbrecht & Di Lollo, 
1998). Omitting the T2+1 distractor also decreased the proportion of 
order reversals. Maybe the underlying mechanism can also explain 
the order-error results in the “RSVP-Speed” experiment. Here and 
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there, order errors decreased when the inter-stimulus-interval 
between T2 and the following distractor increased, i.e. T2 backward-
masking was reduced.   
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Explicit Order Experiment 
This experiment was designed to invalidate the objection that the 
attentional blink task with the explicit instruction to report the two 
targets in the correct order differs from the “classic” attentional blink 
task without this order instruction. Since we were aiming for a null-
result, we conducted an a-priori power analysis to ensure we had 
sufficient power to find an effect of at least medium size.  
Method  
Participants: Twenty one students from Paderborn University, 
Germany with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course 
credits or €6 an hour.  
Stimulus and Procedure was identical to the previous experiment; the 
Design differed in several ways: The experiment consisted of two 
separate blocks. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced 
between subjects. In both blocks participants had to report the two 
target-digits embedded in the stream of distractor-letters. T2 could 
appear at lag 1,2,3, or 6. In one block subjects were explicitly told to 
report the targets in the perceived order. In the other block the 
instruction emphasized that the order of report did not matter.   
Results and Discussion 
T1 accuracy, conditional T2 accuracy and proportion of order errors 
as a function of lag can be seen in Figure 4, separately for the blocks 
with and without order instruction. For T2|T1 accuracy and order 
reversals, the main effect of block did not get significant (both F < 1). 
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The same was true for both interactions between block and lag (F < 
1, and F[3,87] = 1.2, p = 0.33). The main effects of lag were of 
course significant (F[3,87] = 23.3, p < 0.05, and F[3,87] = 165.4, p < 
0.05, respectively). Surprisingly, for T1 accuracy the main effect of 
the factor block did get significant (F[3,87] = 11.2, p < 0.05). So did 
the main effect of lag (F[3,87] = 15.7, p < 0.05). However, T1 
accuracy actually improved when participants had to report the two 
targets in correct order. If anything, we had expected that the 
addition of the judgment task would be more demanding and 
therefore accuracies should be impaired compared to the condition 
without order instruction. To summarize, the time course of the 
attentional blink (i.e. the conditional T2 accuracy) and the time 
course of order reversals is not influenced by the addition of the 
explicit instruction to report the two targets in correct order. Subjects 
seem to do that anyway.  
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Task-Set Experiment 
The purpose of this experiment was to test whether the demands of 
the target-identification task had an effect on the subsequent order 
judgment task. We speculated that a more difficult identification task 
could consume more resources. Therefore there would be fewer 
resources left for the order judgment, leading to more order reversals 
due to a higher proportion of order guesses. To realize different 
demands for the identification task we manipulated the target-set 
size. In the baseline condition all digits from 1 – 9 served as targets; 
in the experimental condition the task set was reduced to the digits 
“5” and “7”. This means “5” and “7” were presented in each trial and 
the subject’s only task was to determine which of these two digits 
came first.  
Method  
Participants: Twenty one students from Paderborn University, 
Germany with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course 
credits or €6 an hour.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure was identical to the previous 
experiment except for the following changes: Each item was 
presented for 50 ms. After an ISI of 20 ms the following item was 
shown, resulting in about 14 different items / sec. T1 was placed at 
position 5-10 in the stream. T2 followed at lag 1, 2, or 3. The 
experiment consisted of two separate blocks. The order of blocks 
was counterbalanced between subjects. In the baseline block, the 
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target set consisted of the digits 1-9. The participants’ task was to 
report the two target-digits in correct order (2 out of 9). In the 
experimental block, the targets were always the “5” and the “7” in 
random order. The participant’s task was to report which digit came 
first (1 out of 2). Each lag in each block was repeated 40 times.  
Results and Discussion 
The proportion of order reversals can be seen in Figure 5. A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant main effects of 
condition (“2 out of 9” vs. “1 out of 2”) and lag (F[1,40] = 26.4, p < 
0.05 and F[2,40] = 14.3, p < 0.05, respectively). The interaction 
between these factors was nonsignificant (F < 1). Unexpectedly, 
order reversals increased when the task set was smaller and the task 
therefore easier. This could be due to guessing since participants in 
the “1 out of 2” condition could have simply guessed the order on 
every trial without even paying attention to the stream. However, 
additional experiments indicate that this effect holds true even when 
participants have the opportunity to refrain from their judgment 
(Hilkenmeier, Weiss, Olivers, Scharlau, 2011).  
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SD-ISI Variation Experiment 
This experiment was originally motivated by Chua (personal 
communication) who argued that the relatively high proportion of 
order reversals found in our lab might be due to the fact that we 
usually present the stimuli without inter stimulus interval. He 
predicted that a reduced stimulus duration combined with longer ISI 
should lead to a clearer separation of the two targets and thus less 
order reversals. 
Method  
Participants: Twenty three students from Paderborn University, 
Germany with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course 
credits or €6 an hour.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure was identical to the previous 
experiment except for the following changes: The combination of 
stimulus duration and inter stimulus interval was held constant to 
about 68 ms / item. Within these 70 ms, we changed the SD/ISI in 
four steps: SD 17 ms, ISI 51 ms; SD 34 ms, ISI 34 ms; SD 51 ms, ISI 
17 ms; SD 68 ms, ISI 0 ms. These four possible conditions were 
intermixed into a single session. T2 always followed T1 at lag 1 and 
was repeated 30 times per condition.  
Results and Discussion 
The proportion of order reversals can be seen in Figure 7 (left). A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of  
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SD / ISI variation (F<1). The same was true for T1 and conditional T2 
accuracy (right side of Figure 5; F[3,66] = 1.3, p = 0.28 and F[3,66] = 
1.5, p = 0.22, respectively). This indicates that a longer ISI and thus 
an apparent easier separation between the targets does not 
influence target performance or perceived order at all.   
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RSVP-Speed Experiment 
The rationale of this experiment was to replicate and extend the 
finding of Bowman and Wyble (2007) that lag-1 sparing is not bound 
to the T1+1 position, but to the first 100 ms after T1 presentation, 
regardless of the number of items presented within this time-span. 
Here, we wanted to test whether this is true for temporal order 
reversals between T1 and T2 as well. 
Method 
Participants: Twenty one students from Paderborn University, 
Germany with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course 
credits or €6 an hour.  
 
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure: Stimulus generation and response 
recording were again done using the Tscope programming library; 
ancillary conditions like stimulus size and color were as in the original 
experiment of Bowman and Wyble, 2007. The experiment consisted 
of four separate blocks which varied the presentation speed of the 
RSVP stream by manipulating the inter stimulus interval. In the 
fastest condition the stimulus duration was 50 ms and the ISI 0 ms, 
resulting in 20 different items / second. In the next condition SD was 
again 50 ms and ISI was 25 ms, resulting in about 13.3 items / 
second. In the third condition, SD was 50 ms and ISI was 50 ms as 
well. Here, 10 items / second were presented, replicating a standard 
attentional blink. In the last condition, SD was again held constant to 
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50 ms, but ISI was increased to 100 ms, resulting in about 6.7 items / 
second. In each condition the TOAs up to 1000 ms were covered. 
This means that in the “50 ms” condition, T2 could appear at a TOA 
of 50 ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms and so on, leading to 20 lags in 
that condition. In the “75 ms” condition, T2 could appear with a TOA 
of 75 ms, 150 ms, 225 ms and so on up to a TOA of 975 ms. The 
equivalent was true for the “100 ms” and the “150 ms condition”. 
Each lag in each condition was repeated 20 times, leading to 1000 
experimental trials, divided in two sessions lasting about an hour 
each.  
Results and Discussion 
 
The proportion of conditional T2 accuracy can be seen in Figure 8. 
As is clear from a visual inspection, we could replicate Bowman and 
Wyble’s first main finding that lag 1 sparing can spread to later lags 
when the presentation speed increases. However, what is also clear 
from a visual inspection is that we could not replicate their second 
main finding, i.e., that the time course of the AB is independent from 
presentation speed (Figure 19 in Bowman & Wyble, 2007). The 
bottom of the curve seems to be wider and the slope less 
pronounced, i.e. the second target does not recover as much. For 
better comparison I conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with the 
same data-points as Bowman and Wyble did, i.e. I focused on the 
“50 ms” and “100 ms” condition and only compared the TOAs 100 
ms, 200 ms, 300 ms, 400 ms, 500 ms, 600 ms, 700 ms, and 800 ms.   
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As expected, there was a significant main effect of lag (F[7,112] = 
10.5, p < 0.05) and a significant main effect of presentation speed 
(F[1,112] = 89.9, p < 0.05). The latter one simply means that, 
unsurprisingly, the overall accuracy in the faster condition was lower. 
However, unlike in Bowman and Wyble, the interaction between 
speed and lag showed a significant effect as well (F[7,112] = 2.3, p < 
0.05). The shape of the AB curve differed in the two presentation 
speeds. It is yet unclear what causes the discrepancy between the 
results in our own lab and the ones found by Bowman and Wyble 
(2007).  
The answer to the main question, however, can be seen in the lower 
part of Figure 8.  Order reversals seem to spread to later lags as 
well. As with lag-1 sparing, the important variable seems to be the 
temporal distance between T1 and T2, not the number of 
intermediate distractors between them. More interestingly and more 
surprisingly is the finding that at the same TOA there are more order 
errors for faster presentation speeds. This means that there are more 
order reversals, even though the targets are delineated by more 
intermediate distractors. Holm-Bonferroni corrected t-tests show that 
this is true for the whole spectrum in which order errors occur, i.e. up 
to a TOA of 400 ms (all t[16] > 2.2, all p < 0.05). As speculated 
previously, this might have to do with the effect that T2 backward 
masking gets stronger with faster presentation times. However, 
please note that we only take trials into account in which both targets 
were identified. In the trials that consider, backward masking did not 
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hinder T2 on being identified. It just seems to selectively hinder a 
correct order judgment.  
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Target Colors Experiment 
In this experiment, I wanted to test the effect of target-color on the 
proportion of order reversals. 
Method 
Participants: Sixteen students from Paderborn University, Germany 
with (corrected-to-) normal vision participated for course credits or €6 
an hour.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure was identical to the T2+1 blank 
experiment described earlier except for the following changes: In half 
of the trials both target items were colored red, whereas they stayed 
black in the remaining half. T1 and T2 always followed each other in 
lag 1. Each condition was repeated 50 times, mixed into a single 
session lasting less than twenty minutes.  
Results and Discussion 
T1 accuracy, conditional T2 accuracy and proportion of order errors 
can be seen in Figure 9, separately for trials in which both targets 
were black and for trials in which both targets were red. 
Unsurprisingly, T1 accuracy improved when T1 and T2 differed in 
color from the surrounding distractors (t[15] = 4.9, p < 0.05). T2|T1 
performance did not improve significantly. This might be due to a 
ceiling effect (t < 1). The proportion of order errors was also strongly 
influenced by the color manipulation: when both targets were 
colored, there were significantly less order reversals (t[15] = 3.8, p < 
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0.05). As discussed in the main text, this might be due to different 
backward masking conditions of T2.   
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Single vs. Dual Stream Experiment 
In this experiment I wanted to test the influence of distractor 
presence and target location on the proportion of order reversals. 
These two factors as well as task-set size are the main differences 
between the TOJ paradigm and the AB paradigm. Since we already 
rejected task-set size as the source for the different time courses of 
order reversals in these two paradigms, I figured that one of the other 
factors (or at least their interaction) should have a major influence on 
order reversals. 
Method 
Participants: Participants were students from Paderborn University, 
Germany. As evidenced by a simple visual test, all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were paid 6€ / hour for participation. 
Twenty participants took part in this experiment.   
Apparatus: The experiment took place in a dimly lit room. The 
participants sat at a distance of 57 cm – set by a chin rest – from a 
19’’ CRT screen. The centre of the monitor was at eye level and its 
resolution set to 800 x 600 pixels at 60 Hz. The experimental 
program was written in MATLAB 7.7.0 including the PsychToolbox 
(Brainard, 1997). The observers responded by pressing keys on the 
keypad. 
Stimuli: Stimuli were black on a medium grey background. The digits 
1 to 9 provided the target set. Distractors were chosen from the 
letters of the Roman alphabet (except for I, O, Q, B, S). All stimuli 
 111 
 
subtended approximately 1° in visual angle. Each stimulus was 
presented for 66 ms and immediately followed by the next item. This 
yielded a presentation rate of 15 items/sec. The presentation rate 
therefore is in between the speed of a typical attentional blink which 
is about 10 items/sec and a standard TOJ paradigm, which usually 
presents stimuli at about 33 ms. This was a compromise to gain 
enough order errors in the TOJ task (which decrease with increasing 
SOA between the two target-stimuli), and also to ensure for the AB 
task not being too difficult. 
Design: There were four separate blocks in this experiment, each 
initiated by a 30 practice trials and a separate instruction. In the 
standard AB block, both target digits appeared in a single stream at 
the center of the screen among letter-distractors. The two targets 
were shown immediately after each other (66 ms target-onset 
asynchrony (TOA) / lag 1), with one intervening distractor (TOA 132 
ms / lag 2) or with two distractors between them (TOA 198 ms / lag 
3). The AB without distractors block was identical to the standard AB 
condition, just without distractors. In the standard TOJ block the two 
targets appeared at different locations without any distractors. 
Fixation was marked by a “#” sign exactly between the two locations. 
In the TOJ with distractors condition, there were two streams of 
distractors. T1 was presented in one, T2 in the other stream. The 
lags between the two targets were the same in all conditions. The 
order of the four blocks was counterbalanced between subjects. 
Each lag in each block was repeated 30 times resulting in 360 
           112 
 
experimental trials in total. Both targets were selected randomly from 
the digits 1-9 while never being identical. Distractors – if present – 
were also selected randomly with the constrain that no single letter 
was presented twice in succession within a trial. 
Procedure: Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space bar. 
After a delay of about 1000 ms, a fixation cross (a black “#”-sign) was 
presented at the center of the screen for approximately another 1000 
ms. Each stream began and ended with a # sign. In between these 
signs there always were 2 targets as well as either 0 or 4 distractors, 
depending on block. After each trial the observers identified the two 
targets in order of appearance by pressing the corresponding keys 
on the keypad. In case they had not recognized one or both targets, 
they were encouraged to guess. The experiment lasted about an 
hour and was conducted within a single session. 
Results and Discussion 
The lower right part of Figure 10 shows the conditional T2|T1 
accuracy as a function of lag separately for each condition. As 
expected, participants had no difficulties identifying both targets if 
they were not embedded in a stream of distractors (“AB without 
Distractors” and “TOJ without Distractors”, respectively). The T2|T1 
accuracy for the standard AB with distractors also follows the usual 
pattern: T2 is spared at lag 1. T2 accuracy then decreases at lag 2 
and 3. The T2|T1 accuracy in the “TOJ with Distractors” condition is 
lower since T2 is in a different stream and is therefore missed more 
often. The “TOJ with Distractors” condition also shows lag-1 sparing, 
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but a weaker one than in the standard AB condition. This finding is in 
line with Shih (2008) and Jefferies and colleages (Jefferies, 
Ghorashi, Kawahara, & Di Lollo, 2007) who claim that lag-1 sparing 
with targets in different streams can be found when observers have 
no foreknowledge of T1’s location. The left part of Figure 10 shows 
the proportion of order errors separately for each lag and condition. A 
three-way repeated measures ANOVA of arc-sine transformed order 
errors including Distractor Presence, Task (AB/TOJ) and Lag as 
factors found a main effect of Lag (F[2, 38] = 46.6, p < .01), meaning 
that order errors decreased with increasing temporal distance 
between the targets. The ANOVA also showed a main effect of 
distractor presence (F[1, 19] = 113, p < .01). As clear from Figure 10, 
participants made much more order errors in conditions in which 
distractors were present. The main effect of task was also significant 
(F[1, 19] = 39.6, p < .01), indicating that it was more likely to reverse 
the order of the two targets when they were shown at different 
locations. More importantly, distractor and task did not interact (F < 
1), indicating that the presence of distractors influences both tasks in 
a similar vain. The interaction of distractor and lag just failed to reach 
significance (F[2, 38] = 2.9, p = 0.065), the influence of lag on the 
distractor effect is therefore not reliable. The two-way interaction 
between task and lag (F[2, 38] = 3.9, p < .05) and the three way 
interaction (F[2, 38] = 6.2, p < .01) both showed significant effects. 
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Cueing SOAs on a fine scale 
To more precisely determine the peak of prior entry in RSVP we 
looked at cueing SOAs between 0 and 100 ms in 10 ms steps. Since 
all six subexperiments of Experiment 1 in Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, 
Weiß, and Olivers (2011) led to qualitatively the same results, we 
only ran one variation, namely the sustained cue of Experiment 1b.  
Method 
16 participants from Paderborn University took part in this 
experiment.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure: Stimulus generation and response 
recording were programmed in C using the Tscope programming 
library. After an approximately 1000 ms blank period, a 0.5 x 0.5˚ 
black fixation cross was presented for another 1000 ms in the center 
of the display. It was replaced by a rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) of 18 digits and letters, presented in Courier New 
(approximately 0.8 x 0.8˚ in size). The letters I, O, Q, S, and Z were 
excluded, as was the number 1. Each item was presented ten times 
in succession for 10 ms each, without any ISI. The item was then 
immediately replaced by the next one, resulting in 10 different 
items/sec. Splitting each item into ten pieces allowed us to color each 
piece independently. T1 and T2 were letters, whose first halves (50 
ms) were always colored, whereas the second halves were black 
again. The two targets, following each other in lag 1, were embedded 
in a stream of black distractor letters and digits. T1 was placed at 
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position 8-13 in the stream. The distractor preceding T1 was always 
a digit. The participant’s task was to report the colored letters at the 
end of the trial, unspeeded, and with feedback (for which order errors 
were counted as correct).  
There were eleven cueing SOAs: The “No Cue” condition in which 
only the first halves of the two targets were colored red, a “10 ms” 
condition in which the last tenth of the distractor-digit immediately 
preceding T1 was colored red, a “20 ms” condition, in which the two 
last tenth of the distractor-digit preceding T1 were colored, and so 
on. The longest cueing SOA was 100 ms, i.e. the complete 
distractor-digit preceding T1 was colored in red.  Each of the eleven 
different cueing conditions was repeated 40 times and randomly 
mixed in a single session. The experiment lasted about 50 minutes. 
Results & Discussion 
 
Figure 16: Left: Proportion of order reversals as a function of cueing 
SOA. Right: T1 accuracy, T2|T1 accuracy and T1 benefit over T2|T1 
as a function of cueing SOA. 
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Figure 16 (left) shows the proportion of order reversals as a function 
of cueing SOA. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the same factor 
revealed a significant effect. (F[10, 150] = 4.2, p < 0.05). Since we 
have to correct the pairwise comparisons for at least 10 t-tests, none 
of them reached significance when using Holm-Bonferroni correction. 
However, uncorrected, the 20 ms, 30 ms, 40 ms, and 50 ms cueing 
SOAs all showed a significant reduction in order reversals compared 
to the No cue condition (all t[15] > 2.3, all p < 0.05, uncorrected). 
Since all of these data-points neighbor each other, we would argue 
that the strongest reduction is indeed quite early, although not 
statistically reliable. As can be seen in Figure 16, order reversals 
monotonically decrease up to the cueing SOA of 50 ms and then 
start to increase again. Thus, from a visual inspection of Figure 16, 
the peak should be somewhere between the 30 and 50 ms cueing 
SOA. T1 accuracy and T1 benefit over T2|T1 somewhat mirror the 
time course of order-reversals. However, the strong T1 benefit at 
longer cueing SOAs is due to a reduced T2 accuracy, not due to an 
increased T1 performance. 
In terms of modeling, the results are disillusioning at first. As can be 
seen in Figure 17, a distractor like cue (i.e. eliciting facilitation and 
inhibition with 50 ms offset) predicts the by far strongest cueing effect 
for the earliest cueing SOAs of 10 and 20 ms.  
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Figure 17: estimated time before T2 overtakes T1 as a function of 
cueing SOA. Blue: the cue elicits both a facilitatory and an inhibitory 
effect. Red: cues < 50 ms trigger only facilitation. 
 
But why should we assume that such a shortly presented cue elicits 
inhibition at all? As already described, the system starts inhibiting as 
soon as it realizes that it is dealing with a colored distractor and not 
with a real target. This process is assumed to take about 50 ms. 
Thus, the start of the inhibition is 50 ms after distractor-cue onset. In 
turn, I would argue that cues < 50 ms do not trigger any inhibition. 
Before the system realizes that it was tricked by a colored distractor, 
this distractor is overwritten by a real target. Thus, the system has no 
reason to start inhibition. The red bars of Figure 17 show the 
predicted time course of facilitation when cues < 50 ms only trigger 
facilitation. The estimated time course nearly perfectly matches the 
empirical one (Figure 16). In both the simulated and the empirical 
data, the strongest facilitation is at 50 ms. Moreover, in both cases 
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the increase in facilitation for the first 50 ms is less steep than the 
decrease for cueing SOAs > 50 ms.  
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Monoptic/dichoptic blink 
The original purpose of this experiment was to explore the influences 
of early masking effects that occur before binocular integration (e.g. 
Lumer, 1998) on the shape of the attentional blink. 
Method 
23 students from Paderborn University took part in this experiment.  
Stimulus, Design, and Procedure: 
The experiment was run on a 120 Hz TFT monitor. Participants wore 
active shutter glasses (synchronized with the refresh rate of the 
monitor) that opened and closed 60 times per second. Thus, a single 
frame was presented to only one eye for 8.3 ms. For this time the 
glasses of the other eye were closed. This way, we could present 
different visual information to each eye. The RSVP stream consisted 
of 10 items / sec. Each item was only presented to one eye. When a 
stimulus was presented to the left eye, it appeared for 8.3 ms while 
the left glass of the shutter glasses was opened. When the left glass 
closed and the right glass opened, the stimulus disappeared for 8.3 
ms. All that was presented to the right eye was the background color 
(grey). When the right glass closed and the left glass opened again, 
the stimulus was again presented, so that the left eye could see it. 
Thus, each stimulus was presented for 6 x 8.3 ms (with 8.3 ms 
between each repetition).   
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Figure 18: schematic representation of a single item presented in the 
“monoptic/dichoptic blink” experiment 
 
The experiment consisted of three conditions: a) all stimuli were 
presented to one eye, b) the stimuli were presented alternating to 
each eye, but both targets were always presented to the same eye, 
c) the stimuli were presented alternating to each eye, but the targets 
were always presented to different eyes.  
In each condition, T2 could appear in lag 1, 2, 3, or 6. Each lag in 
each condition was repeated 30 times. The participant’s task was to 
report the two taget-letters at the end of the trial. 
Results and Discussion 
T1 accuracy, conditional T2 accuracy and proportion of order errors 
as a function of lag can be seen in Figure 15, separately for the 
baseline condition (all stimuli presented to one eye) and the two 
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experimental conditions (stimuli alternating between the eyes, targets 
either both presented to the same eye or to different eyes). 
To better understand the different masking conditions utilized in each 
lag, Figure 19 shows a schematic representation of these trials. A 
repeated measures one way analysis of variance showed a 
significant main effect of condition on T1 accuracy (F[2,66]= 8.6, p < 
0.001), a significant main effect of lag (F[3,66]= 26.4, p < 0.001), and 
a significant interaction of condition with lag (F[6,66]= 4.1, p < 0.001).  
The same analysis on T2|T1 accuracy revealed significant main 
effects for condition (F[2,66]= 14.4, p < 0.001)and lag (F[3,66]= 17.1, 
p < 0.001), as well as a significant interaction (F[6,66]= 6.0, p < 
0.001). For order reversals, the main effect of condition showed no 
significant effect (F<1) whereas lag as well as the interaction of lag 
and condition were again significant (F[3,66]= 169, p < 0.001 and 
F[6,66]= 6.5, p < 0.001, respectively). However, more important than 
the mere analyses of variance between the conditions are planned t-
tests between two conditions at a given lag.  
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Figure 19: schematic representation of lag 1, 2, and 3 of the 
“alternating stimuli, targets presented to the same eye” (left) and the 
“alternating stimuli, targets presented to different eyes” (right) 
conditions. The baseline condition in which all stimuli are presented 
to one eye is not shown.  
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As can be seen in Figure 19, T1 performance at lag 1 is worse when 
T2 is presented to the same eye compared to T2 being presented to 
a different eye (t[22] = 4.2, p < 0.001 and t[22] = 3.5, p < 0.01 for all 
stimuli presented to one eye and stimuli alternating but targets in one 
eye, respectively). The reversed pattern is found for the conditional 
T2 accuracy. Here, performance decreased when T2 was presented 
at a different eye than T1 (t[22] = 6.4, p <0.001 and t[22] = 2.5, p < 
0.05, respectively). These findings, in combination with the result that 
there are more order reversals when the two targets are presented to 
the same eye (t[22] = 4.3, p < 0.001 for alternating stimuli, targets in 
the same eye) strongly suggests that interdependence between the 
two targets is much stronger when T1 and T2 are presented to the 
same eye. As already discussed in the main text, these findings were 
not necessarily to be expected since the fovea (with which the 
targets are most likely fixated) has projections in both hemifields. 
However, as Bachmann (2007, personal communication) pointed out, 
thalamo-cortical as well as cortico-thalamic retouch effects are most 
likely laterally biased to the eye of the input, suggesting that 
increased T2 accuracy and increased proportion of order reversals 
are indeed due to a facilitatory modulation elicited by T1.  
However, we also found evidence for the a priory assumed influence 
of early masking: at lags 2 and 3, when the blink is most pronounced, 
T2 accuracy was stronger impaired when masking for T2 (and 
especially backward masking, as argued earlier in this manuscript) 
was stronger: At lag 2, in the “alternating stimuli, targets in the same 
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eye” condition, the distractors immediately preceding and trailing T2 
were presented to the other eye. Thus, masking was weak and T2 
performance high. In the “alternating stimuli, targets in different eyes” 
condition, the stimulus preceding T2 was presented to the other eye, 
but the stimulus trailing T2 was presented to the same eye as T2. 
Thus, forward masking of T2 was weak, whereas backward masking 
was strong. Nevertheless, T2 performance in this condition was as 
impaired as in the baseline condition in which all stimuli were 
presented to one eye, i.e. forward and backward masking were 
strong (t < 1; comparisons to the weak-masking “alternating stimuli, 
targets in different eyes” condition: t[22] = 3.9, p < 0.001 and t[22] = 
5.5, p < 0.001, respectively), again indicating that first and foremost 
the distractor trailing T2 has a strong influence on the shape of the 
blink. At lag 3 the picture is qualitatively the same: in both alternating 
targets conditions the distractors immediately preceding and trailing 
T2 are presented to the different eye. Thus masking is low and T2 
performance in both conditions is relatively good (t[22] = 2.3, 
nonsignificant after correction).  When all stimuli are presented to the 
same eye and thus masking is stronger, T2 performance 
consequently decreases (t[22] = 4.8, p < 0.001 and t[22] = 3.0, p < 
0.01, respectively).  
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Informationen aus unserer Umwelt aufzunehmen, auszuwählen und 
gegeneinander abzuwägen sind fundamentale Bestandteile der 
menschlichen Wahrnehmung und eine notwenige Voraussetzung um 
erfolgreich mit unserer Umgebung interagieren zu können. Obwohl 
uns das Ergebnis dieser Prozesse, unsere alltägliche Wahrnehmung, 
so mühelos erscheint (wir öffnen einfach unsere Augen, und schon 
sehen wir ein scheinbar vollständiges, detailreiches, scharfes, und 
farbiges Bild unserer Umwelt), so ist doch ein großer Anteil unseres 
Gehirns damit beschäftigt, diesen Eindruck zu erzeugen, den unser 
Sinnesapparat (unsere Augen) aufgrund seiner Physiologie gar nicht 
liefern kann. Ein entscheidender Aspekt in der Erzeugung unserer 
Sinneseindrücke ist, dass momentan wichtige Information von 
momentan weniger Information getrennt wird. Dieser Prozess ist 
allgemein bekannt als selektive Aufmerksamkeit.  Wie und nach 
welchen Kriterien Aufmerksamkeit arbeitet, ist eines der 
meistbeforschten Themen der Psychologie und reicht zurück bis zu 
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den Anfängen unserer Disziplin zu Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) 
und William James (1890). Der Großteil der frühen Arbeiten 
beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Reize Aufmerksamkeit an sich 
ziehen und wie Aufmerksamkeit im Raum verteilt wird, wenn mehrere 
Stimuli gleichsam um Aufmerksamkeit konkurrieren(z.B. Posner, 
1980; oder Jonides, 1981). Das Interesse an zeitlichen Aspekten von 
Aufmerksamkeit hat erst in den vergangenen 25 Jahren stark 
zugenommen. Was passiert, wenn nicht alle Reize gleichzeitig, 
sondern nacheinander dargeboten werden? Um die zeitliche 
Dynamik von Aufmerksamkeit zu untersuchen, hat sich vor allem das 
„schnelle, serielle visuelle Präsentation“-Paradigma (rapid serial 
visual presentation; RSVP; Potter & Levy, 1969) etabliert. In diesem 
Paradigma wird eine große Anzahl von Reizen (typischerweise 
zwischen 15 und 25) sequenziell hintereinander am selben Ort 
präsentiert. Jeder Reiz wird für ca. 100 Millisekunden (ms) gezeigt 
und dann unmittelbar vom nächsten Stimulus überschrieben. Dieses 
Paradigma kann mit einer Vielzahl von Reizklassen verwendet 
werden, beispielsweise alphanumerischen Zeichen, Bildern oder 
Wörtern, aber auch Tönen oder taktilen Reizen (für einen Überblick, 
siehe z.B. Martens & Wyble, 2010). Ein weitverbreitetes 
Versuchsdesign ist es, die Versuchsperson zwei zuvor spezifizierte 
Zielreize in einer Reihe von Ablenkerreizen (Distraktoren) berichten 
zu lassen, beispielsweise zwei farbige Buchstaben in einer Reihe 
von schwarzen Zahlen. Während die Versuchsteilnehmer mühelos 
den ersten Zielreiz erkennen können, berichten sie oft den zweiten 
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Zielreiz nicht gesehen zu haben, wenn er dem ersten in einem 
Abstand von ca. 200 – 600 ms folgt. Dieses Phänomen wird als 
„Aufmerksamkeitsblinzeln“ (Attentional Blink; AB; Raymond, Shapiro, 
& Arnell, 1992) bezeichnet.  
 
Abbildung 1: Links: Schematischer Ablauf eines Versuchs-
durchgangs. Rechts: Identifikationsleistung für den ersten 
(gepunktet) und den zweiten (durchgezogen) Zielreiz in Abhängigkeit 
vom zeitlichen Abstand zwischen den beiden Reizen. 
 
Ursprünglich wurde die schlechte Erkennensleistung des zweiten 
Zielreizes dadurch erklärt, dass dem kognitiven System nicht 
genügend Ressourcen zur Verfügung stünden, um beide Zielreize zu 
verarbeiten: Wenn der zweite Zielreiz kurz nach dem ersten kommt, 
hat der erste schon nahezu alle Ressourcen verbraucht, der zweite 
geht folglich leer aus und kann nicht adäquat verarbeitet werden 
(z.B. Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1996; Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 
1994). 
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Wie allerdings in Abbildung 1 zu sehen ist, ist die Erkennensleistung 
des zweiten Zielreizes sehr gut, wenn dieser direkt nach dem ersten 
gezeigt wird (das sogenannte „lag-1 sparing“, Potter, Chun, 
Muckenhoupt, 1998; Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999). Um diesen 
reliablen Befund erklären zu können, wurden die Theorien, die 
begrenzte kognitive Ressourcen als Ursache für den Attentional Blink 
ansehen, um zusätzliche Annahmen erweitert: Die wichtigste 
Annahme ist, dass die Verarbeitung in zwei Schritten, oder Stufen 
abläuft. Auf einer ersten, kapazitätsfreien Stufe können alle 
dargebotenen Reize parallel verarbeitet werden. Damit ein Zielreiz 
aber berichtet werden kann, also bewusst wahrgenommen wird, 
muss dieser erst in eine zweite Stufe überführt und dort konsolidiert 
werden. In dieser zweiten Stufe sind die Ressourcen dann wieder, 
wie im vorherigen Modell, stark beschränkt, d.h. die  zweite Stufe 
kann die eingehenden Informationen nur seriell bearbeiten. Wenn 
nun der erste Zielreiz auf der ersten Stufe erkannt wird, öffnet er ein 
„Aufmerksamkeitsfenster“ und wird zur weiteren Verarbeitung auf die 
zweite Stufe transferiert (z.B. Chun & Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur, Tombu, 
Oriet, Stevanovski, 2002; Visser et al, 1999; Akyürek, Riddell, 
Toffanin, & Hommel, 2007). Solange der erste Zielreiz auf der 
zweiten Stufe verarbeitet wird, muss der zweite Zielreiz auf der 
ersten Stufe verharren und ist dort der Gefahr ausgesetzt, 
überschrieben oder vergessen zu werden. Doch das Fenster, 
welches den ersten Zielreiz auf die zweite Stufe transferiert, schließt 
nicht direkt nach dem ersten Zielreiz. Der Stimulus, der direkt nach 
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dem ersten Zielreiz kommt, wird oft ebenfalls mit in die zweite Stufe 
transferiert. Falls dies der zweite Zielreiz ist, wird dieser also mit dem 
ersten Zielreiz zusammen verarbeitet. Diese gemeinsame 
Verarbeitung, bekannt als „episodic integration“ kann den Zeitverlauf 
des Attentional Blink, wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt, ohne große 
Schwierigkeiten erklären. 
 
Abbildung 2: Bildliche Darstellung des Attentional Blink (oben) und 
des lag-1 sparing (unten) in Modellen, die eine gemeinsame 
Verarbeitung annehmen. 
 
Eine Begleiterscheinung des „lag-1 sparing“ ist, dass die Reihenfolge 
der beiden berichteten Zielreize von den Versuchsteilnehmern oft 
vertauscht wird. Dieser Befund wird oft ebenfalls im Sinne der 
gemeinsamen Verarbeitung interpretiert: Wenn beide Zielreize in 
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einer Episode verarbeitet werden, geht die Reihenfolgeinformation 
notwendigerweise verloren (Chun & Potter, 1995; Bowman & Wyble, 
2007; Hommel & Akyürek, 2005; Akyürek & Hommel, 2005).  
 
Abbildung 3: Anteil der Reihenfolgefehler in Abhängigkeit vom 
zeitlichen Abstand zwischen den beiden Reizen. 
 
Dies ist allerdings nicht die einzig mögliche Erklärung: Anstatt 
anzunehmen, dass die Reihenfolgeinformation schlicht verloren-
gegangen ist, ist es durchaus möglich, dass Versuchspersonen 
einen klaren Reihenfolgeeindruck haben, nur eben oftmals den 
falschen (siehe Caldwell-Harris & Morris, 2008). Dies wäre konsistent 
mit Theorien, die anstelle einer gemeinsamen Verarbeitung einen 
kurzzeitigen Aufmerksamkeitsschub vorhersagen (transient 
attentional enhancement; z.B. Reeves & Sperling, 1986; Nakayama 
& Mackeben, 1989). Einer der verblüffenderen Effekte von 
Aufmerksamkeit ist, dass sie die wahrgenommenen zeitlichen 
Eigenschaften der Reize verändern kann. Ein beachteter Reiz kann 
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also als früher wahrgenommen werden, selbst wenn er gleichzeitig 
oder sogar etwas später dargeboten wird, als ein gleichartiger, aber 
unbeachteter Reiz. Dieses Phänomen des „früheren Eintritts“ (prior 
entry; Titchener, 1908) sagt folglich ebenfalls Reihenfolgefehler 
voraus, jedoch über einen komplett anderen Mechanismus: Anstatt 
davon auszugehen, dass die kognitiven Ressourcen stark limitiert 
sind,  und der zweite Zielreiz nur zufällig und unter dem Verlust der 
zeitlichen Information mit dem ersten zusammen verarbeitet werden 
kann, gehen Theorien des kurzzeitigen Aufmerksamkeitsschubs 
davon aus, dass der erste Zielreiz erleichternd für den zweiten wirkt: 
der erste Zielreiz löst den Aufmerksamkeitsschub aus, doch bevor 
dieser seine Wirkung voll entfalten kann, ist der erste Zielreiz bereits 
durch den zweiten überschrieben worden.   
 
Abbildung 4: Bildliche Darstellung des kurzfristigen Aufmerksam-
keitsschubs und seines Einflusses auf die wahrgenommene 
Reihenfolge. 
 
Im hier vorgestellten empirischen Promotionsprojekt wurde anhand 
der zeitlichen Reihenfolgefehler näher zwischen den oben 
beschriebenen großen Theoriesträngen (begrenzte kognitive 
Ressourcen auf der einen, kurzzeitiger Aufmerksamkeitsschub auf 
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der anderen Seite) unterschieden. Dazu wurden 
Experimentalbedingungen kreiert, für welche die beiden 
Theoriezweige unterschiedliche Vorhersagen machen. 
Dabei wurde das Cueing-Paradigmas benutzt, das schon von 
Nieuwenstein, Chun, van der Lubbe, und Hooge (2005), 
Nieuwenstein (2006), und  Olivers und Meeter (2008) eingesetzt 
wurde. Theorien des kurzfristigen Aufmerksamkeitsschubs vermuten, 
dass der erste Zielreiz einen Aufmerksamkeitsschub einleitet, vom 
zweiten Zielreiz jedoch schon überschrieben wird, bevor sich der 
Großteil der Erleichterung auswirken kann. Der zweite Zielreiz 
profitiert von der gesteigerten Aufmerksamkeit, wird schneller 
verarbeitet und daher in einer Reihe von Durchgängen als früher 
wahrgenommen. Falls es zutrifft, dass das Ausmaß an 
Reihenfolgefehlern also durch das relative Verhältnis von 
Aufmerksamkeit zwischen den beiden Zielreizen bestimmt wird, 
sollten Reihenfolgefehler abnehmen, wenn mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf 
den ersten Zielreiz verlagert wird. Dies wurde erreicht, indem ein 
Hinweisreiz zeitlich direkt vor dem ersten Zielreiz platziert wurde, um  
Aufmerksamkeit auf diesen zu lenken. Von dieser Aufmerksamkeit 
sollte vor allem der erste Zielreiz profitieren. Das relative Verhältnis 
von Aufmerksamkeit sollte sich damit zu seinen Gunsten 
verschieben, d.h. Reihenfolgefehler sollten seltener auftreten.  
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Abbildung 5: links: Schematischer Ablauf eines Versuchsdurchgangs 
für die Standard Attentional-Blink Bedingung ohne Hinweisreiz und 
für die Experimentalbedingung mit Hinweisreiz. Rechts: 
Angenommene Aufmerksamkeits-Erleichterung für Durchgänge ohne 
und mit Hinweisreiz. 
 
Wie erwartet wurden in Durchgängen mit Hinweisreiz weniger 
Reihenfolgefehler gefunden als in Durchgängen ohne einen solchen 
Hinweisreiz (Olivers, Hilkenmeier, & Scharlau, 2010). Dies ist ein 
klares Indiz dafür, dass die Reihenfolgefehler im Attentional Blink 
tatsächlich durch einen kurzzeitigen Aufmerksamkeitsschub und 
„prior entry“ erklärt werden können.  
Allerdings können die Ergebnisse aus Olivers et al. (2010) in 
gewisser Weise auch durch „episodic integration“ erklärt werden: Da 
der Hinweisreiz gewisse Eigenschaften mit den Zielreizen teilt (in 
diesem Fall die Farbe), ist es plausibel anzunehmen, dass dieser 
Hinweisreiz ebenfalls ein Aufmerksamkeitsfenster öffnen kann, und 
dass der Hinweisreiz gemeinsam mit dem ersten Zielreiz auf der 
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zweiten Stufe verarbeitet wird. Der zweite Zielreiz wird nicht mit auf 
die zweite Stufe transferiert, sondern muss sein eigenes 
Aufmerksamkeitsfenster öffnen. Falls dies gelingt, hat der zweite 
Zielreiz einen anderen Zeitstempel als der erste. Gelingt es nicht, 
kann er nicht berichtet werden. Die Befunde zeigen, dass die 
Erkennensleistung des zweiten Zielreizes tatsächlich abnimmt, wenn 
vor dem ersten Zielreiz ein Hinweisreiz eingeblendet wird (Olivers et 
al., 2010). Dies könnte für eine gemeinsame Verarbeitung in einer 
Episode sprechen, auch wenn für diese Vermutung noch einige 
Zusatzannahmen nötig sind (siehe Olivers et al., 2010; Hilkenmeier, 
Olivers, & Scharlau, 2011).     
 
Abbildung 7: Hinweisreiz und erster Zielreiz werden in einer 
gemeinsamen Episode verarbeitet. Obwohl der zweite Zielreiz direkt 
hinter dem ersten kommt, gelingt es ihm, in einer neuen Episode 
ebenfalls in die zweite Stufe zu gelangen und dort separat verarbeitet 
zu werden.  
 
In der ersten Studie konnte also „prior entry“ als Alternative zur weit 
verbreiteten Annahme der „episodic integration“ etabliert werden. In 
einem zweiten Schritt wurden Experimentalbedingungen 
herangezogen, die klarer zwischen diesen beiden theoretischen 
Annahmen unterscheiden können. In Hilkenmeier, Olivers und 
Scharlau (2011) wurde einen Hinweisreiz direkt vor dem zweiten 
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Zielreiz dargeboten. Laut „episodic integration“ sollte sich diese 
Manipulation nicht von einer Kontrollbedingung ohne Hinweisreiz 
unterscheiden, da der Hinweisreiz erst nach dem ersten Zielreiz, also 
wenn die Episode bereits begonnen hat, präsentiert wird. Die „prior 
entry“ Erklärung hingegen sagt voraus, dass dieser Hinweisreiz dazu 
führen sollte, dass der zweite Zielreiz mehr Aufmerksamkeit 
bekommt, Reihenfolgefehler also zunehmen sollten.  
  
Abbildung 6: links: Schematischer Ablauf eines Versuchsdurchgangs 
für die Experimentalbedingung mit Hinweisreiz vor dem zweiten 
Zielreiz. Mitte: Angenommene Aufmerksamkeits-Erleichterung für 
Durchgänge mit Hinweisreiz vor dem zweiten Zielreiz. Rechts: 
Angenommene episodische Verarbeitung. Beide Zielreize werden, 
wie in der Kontrollbedingung ohne Hinweisreize, in einer 
gemeinsamen Episode verarbeitet. 
 
Die empirischen Daten zeigen eine klare Zunahme von 
Reihenfolgefehlern, belegen also die Theorie der kurzfristigen 
Aufmerksamkeitserleichterung. Dies hat weitreichende Folgen für die 
theoretischen Erklärungen des Attentional Blink: Wie bereits 
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beschrieben wurde die Zusatzannahme der gemeinsamen 
episodischen Verarbeitung getroffen, um „lag-1 sparing“ im Rahmen 
begrenzter kognitiver Ressourcen erklären zu können. Die 
begleitenden zeitlichen Reihenfolgefehler wurden als einer der 
Hauptbelege für diese theoretische Erklärung herangezogen. In den 
vorliegenden Studien wurde gezeigt, dass die Manipulation von 
Reihenfolgefehlern im Attentional Blink nicht schlüssig durch 
gemeinsame episodische Verarbeitung erklärt werden kann. Einer 
der Hauptbefunde für „episodic integration“ fällt also weg. Ohne 
diesen Mechanismus kann der  komplette Zeitverlauf des Attentional 
Blink allerdings nur noch schwerlich durch begrenzte Ressourcen 
erklärt werden. Stattdessen erhärtet dieser Befund neuere Theorien, 
die den Attentional Blink nicht als Beleg für begrenzte Ressourcen, 
sondern als vorübergehenden Kontrollverlust (Di Lollo,  Kawahara, 
Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005), oder als Resultat der Distraktor-
Verarbeitung ansehen (Olivers & Meeter, 2008). 
Nachdem nun ein Einfluss von „prior entry“ auf die zeitlichen 
Reihenfolgefehler im Attentional Blink belegt ist, wurde in einer 
weiteren Studie dem Zeitverlauf dieser Erleichterung untersucht 
(Hilkenmeier, Scharlau, Weiß, & Olivers, 2011). Dabei konnte gezeigt 
werden, dass Hinweisreize, die nicht nur Zielreiz-, sondern auch 
Distraktoreingenschaften besitzen, eine nur kurzfristige Erleichterung 
auslösen. Diese Erleichterung erreicht ihren Höhepunkt schon nach 
ca. 50 ms. Falls der Hinweisreiz hingegen nur Zielreizeigenschaften 
besitzt, verlängert sich die Erleichterung auf ca. 100 ms. Dieses 
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Befundmuster konnte durch ein einfaches computationales Modell 
vorhergesagt werden, das auf bisherigen Theorien der kurzfristigen 
Aufmerksamkeitsverlagerung aufbaut (Bachmann, 1984; Reeves & 
Sperling, 1986; Nakayama & Mackeben, 1989; Olivers & Meeter, 
2008, Wyble, Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009).  
 
Abbildung 7: links: Simulationen des computationalen Modells. Links: 
Hinweisreiz mit Distraktoreigenschaften. Dieser Reiz löst nicht nur 
eine Erleichterung, sondern auch eine verzögerte Inhibierung  aus. 
Rechts: Hinweisreiz nur mit Zielreizeingeschaften. Dieser Reiz löst 
ausschließlich Erleichterung aus. 
 
Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass es im hier vorliegenden 
Promotionsprojekt gelungen ist, den Einfluss einer kurzfristigen 
Aufmerksamkeitserleichterung auf Reihenfolgefehler im Attentional 
Blink nachzuweisen. Dies hat nicht nur für Theorien des Attentional 
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Blink eine gewisse Bedeutung, sondern zeigt darüber hinaus auch, 
dass sich verschiedene experimentelle Paradigmen auf gemeinsame 
Aufmerksamkeitsmechanismen zurückführen lassen.   
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